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Are Antitrust ''Treble" Damages Really Single
Damages?
ROBERT H. LANDE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Everbody "knows" that antitrust violations lead to mandatory treble
damages and attorneys' fees. This provision appears to constitute automatic
punitive damages, and would seem large enough both to discourage most
defendants from violating the antitrust laws and to over-compensate injured
plaintiffs. The assumption that antitrust damages are trebled has given rise to
several controversies that would be dramatically affected if this assumption
were false.
First, many believe that automatic trebling should not apply to all types of
antitrust violations. The difficulty in detecting and proving many types of
violations has led most analysts to conclude that awards of substantially more
than ·single damages are often sensible. 1 Price fixing and bid rigging, for
example, are difficult to detect and unquestionably anticompetitive, so few

• Associate Professor, University ofBaltimore School ofLaw. An oral version of this
Article was presented in the Antitrust Section program at the 1991 ABA Annual Meeting.
The author would like to thank William Blumenthal, Michael Brockmeyer, Joseph Brodley,
Douglas Ginsburg, Herbert Hovenkamp, Steven Kalos, William Kovacic, Howard Marvel,
Stephen Nagin, Steven Salop and Walter Schwidetzky for extremely useful comments and
suggestions, and William Atkins and Jack Merritt for excellent research assistance. All
opinions and remaining mistakes are those of the author.
1 Damages for "hard core" offenses should be much greater than singlefold to account
for detection problems, proof problems, and risk aversion. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punislunent: An Economic Approach, 16 J. PoL. EcoN. 169, 199 (1%8); see also sources
cited irifra note 3. The presence of these considerations does not necessarily mean that three
is the correct multiplier. If only 20% of existing cartels are detected, for example, a
multiplier of five would be more appropriate. (Then) Assistant Attorney General Douglas
H. Ginsburg, in testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, July 15, 1986, stated his
belief that the probability that price fixing would be detected, indicted, and convicted was
less than one in ten. See Need to Deter Offenses Is Stressed by Ginsberg Before Sentencing
Commission, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1274, at 92 (July 17, 1986). Peter
G. Bryant and E. Woodrow Eckard estimate that between 13% and 17% of price fixing
conspiracies are successfully prosecuted. Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price
Fixing: 1he Probability of Getting Caught, 48 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 531, 531-36 (1991).
This Article will not attempt to ,ascertain whether three is the optimal multiplier to account
for detection problems, proof problems and risk aversion. It will, however, assume that a
large multiplier is appropriate.
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advocate lower penalties for these offenses. Other antitrust violations, however,
including those associated with large mergers and joint ventures, are relatively
simple to detect. Moreover, those offenses judged under the rule of reason are
less likely to be anticompetitive.2 Many in the antitrust community believe that
treble damages should be reserved for per se, "hard core," hard-to-detect
offenses, while penalties for other types of offenses should be reduced to the
single leveJ.3
Second, there is a controversy over whether indirect purchasers should be
given standing to sue for damages. As a result of Rlinois Brick~ only direct
purchasers can now recover treble damages under the federal antitrust laws.
Many states, however, have passed "Rlinois Brick repealers" that allow certain
indirect purchasers to sue,s and federal repeal legislation has been repeatedly
introduced. 6 One argument repeatedly raised against Rlinois Brick repealers is
that they can result in sixfold or greater damages because treble damages might

2 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Vwlations in Antitrust Law: Co'!fUsing Offenses
with Defenses, 77 GEO. LJ. 165 (1988).
3 For analysis and citations to additional discussions, see ABA ANrrrRUST SECITON,
MONOGRAPH No. 13, TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 48-65 (1986) [hereinafter TREBLEDAMAGES REMEDY); 2 PHILIP AREEDA & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANrrrRUST LAW § 331
(1978) (multiple damages could be awarded at the discretion of the court); WILLIAM BREIT
& KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANrrrRUST PENALTY REFoRM 4, 44-46 (1986); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAw: AN EcoNOMIC PERsPECI'IVE 231 (1976) (calling for single
damages for such readily identifiable violations as anticompetitive mergers); \Villiam
Baumol and Janusz Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 247,
263 (1985) ("One should consider both the use of a multiple smaller than three, at least in
those types of cases, such as predatory pricing ••• and in some types of cases one might
even consider [single damages]."); Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28
J.L. & EcoN. 445, 447-48 (1985) (discussing various types of legislative detrebling
proposals); Ira M. Millstein, 1he Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust litigation: Some
Policy Implications, in PRivATE ANrrrRUST LITIGATION 399, 404 (Lawrence White ed.,
1988).
4lllinois Brick Co. v.lllinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
5 "lllinois Brick repealers" have been enacted in 14 states and the District of
Columbia. See Thomas Greene, State Indirect Purchaser Remedies Should Be Preserved, 5
ANTrrRUST 25 (1990).
6 See Thomas B. Leary, State Indirect Purchaser Laws Should Be Preempted, 5
ANTrrRUST 25, 26 (1990).
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be awarded to two or more levels ofplaintiffs.7 Violations of state antitrust8 or
business tort9 law can lead to the same consequences.1o
Third, there is controversy over whether the recovery statute's provision
for treble damages systematically biases anaitrust litigation. Some argue that the
automatic nature of the treble damages multiplier might cause some judges to
favor defendants when they forptulate substantive antitrust rules, measure
ambiguous factual situations against these rules, devise appropriate standing
rules, or compute damages. 11 Some courts might be reluctant to "trebly"

7 See sources cited supra notes 5 and 6.
8 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
9 The same actions can sometimes violate federal antitrust laws as well as state tort
laws or "baby FTC Acts." See, e.g., Multiple Damages Are Awarded in Suit Against Waste
Management Finn, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1458, at 415 (Mar. 22,
1990).
10 Discussing the Supreme Court's decision in California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490
U.S. 93 (1989), which held that state Rlirwis Brick repealers are not preempted by Section 4
of the Clayton Act, Thomas Wilson notes:
[T]he Court's rationale, which makes clear that states are generally free to fashion
their own remedies for antitrust violations, seems quite hospitable to the concept of one
plaintiff recovering treble damages (one-third actual and two-thirds punitive) under
federal law and double damages (punitive only) under state law (or vice versa) from the
same defendant for the same conduct. But because the decision does not address the
distinction, if any, between state and federal antitrust injury, it does not shed any light on
the question whether actual damages are recoverable twice--<mce under state law and
once under federal law-by the same plaintiff, from the same defendant, and for the
same conduct.

See Thomas Wilson, 1he Spectre of Double Recovery in Antitrust Federalism, 58
ANTrrRUSTLJ. 201,206 (1989).
11 See Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Spedal
Attention to Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRivATE ANTrrRUST
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 185 and the sources cited therein, particularly the reference to
a similar analysis by Areeda and Turner at 191. Professor Calkins discusses how the law of
monopolization, horizontal restraints and vertical restraints might have developed more
narrowly because of the effects of damages awards that the courts believed were treble. /d.
at 191-95. He concludes that "class actions probably would be more easily certified were
there no trebling." /d. at 197. Professor Calkins also marshals support by demonstrating
why "it seems probable that trebling is a factor" in causing courts to scrutinize damage
claims more rigorously than they once did." Id. at 198. "Plaintiffs would find standing rules
more hospitable in a single damage world." /d. See also Stephen Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
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penalize defendant(s) or "overreward" plaintiff(s) unless the activity at issue
was outrageous. For this reason the automatic trebling feature, designed to
encourage plaintiffs to bring suit and to discourage defendants from engaging in
anticompetitive behavior, might have the opposite of its intended effect. 12
These heated controversies are all built upon a false foundation, for they
are all predicated upon the assumption that antitrust damages are currently at
the threefold level. This Article will establish that this assumption is mistaken,
and in so doing will help decide the controversies premised upon it. This
Article will show that, when viewed correctly, antitrust damages awards are
approximately equal to, or less than, the actual damages caused by antitrust
violations.
Part ll of this Article will analyze the relatively quantifiable harms from
antitrust violations, modeling the issues under both deterrence and
compensation frameworks. Part m will calculate rough estimates of those
factors that affect the magnitude of the antitrust damages multiplier actually
awarded. These adjustments to the "treble" damages multiplier arise from: (l)
the lack of prejudgment interest; (2) the effects of the statute of limitations; (3)
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; (4) other costs to plaintiffs pursuing cases;
(5) costs to the judicial system in handling antitrust cases; (6) umbrella effects
of market power; (7) allocative inefficiency effects of market power; and (8)
tax effects.13 Part IV will combine these adjustments using both deterrence and

Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065 (1986); Homer Clark, 11te Treble Damage Bo1UlJ1Z(l:
New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REv. 363, 363 (1954)
("[T]he mandatory trebling of any recovery has generated a natural reluctance in the courts
to impose prodigious damages upon violators of the act •••. "); John F. Hart, Standing
Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890-1975, 59 TENN. L. REv. 191, 241-2 (1992).

12 "[A]n award of treble damages for violating section 2's proscription of
'monopolization' in some cases might appear to be unpredictable, capricious and thus,
unfair [because] • • • the line between permissible and impermissible conduct for a
monopolist is too imprecise and unpredictable a basis on which to impose punitive
damages." Joseph L. McEntee, Jr. & Robert C. Kahrl, Damages Caused by the Acquisition
and Use ofMonopoly Power, 49 ANrrrRUST LJ. 165, 167-68 (1980).
13 This Article's analysis omits relatively nonquantifiable factors that also could affect
the true magnitude of the damages multiplier. For example, plaintiffs desiring competent
counsel might have to pay their lawyers more than the attorneys' fees awarded against
defendant by the court. Also, juries might over- or under-award damages depending,
respectively, on whether or not they are unaware of the trebling. See Note, Controlling Jury
Damage Awards' in Private Antitrust Suits, 81 MICH. L. REv. 693, 694-96 (1983). Third,
because members of a conspiracy are responsible for the damages caused by their coconspirators, it can be argued that the amount paid by one conspirator might sometimes be
disproportionate because it encompasses all damages caused by the cartel. Because each
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compensation frameworks. 14 It will compare the sum of the damages caused by
antitrust violations to the typical amounts awarded to successful plaintiffs to
determine, on average, the true effective ratio of recovery to damage. This
analysis will show that when all the appropriate adjustments are considered
together, awarded damages are, at most, probably at the single level. From
either a deterrence or compensation perspective, the actual damages awarded in
civil antitrust cases are therefore, on average, probably only at most equal to
the actual damages caused by the violations. Part V will briefly discuss some
implications of this finding in light of the consensus that antitrust damages
generally should be substantially higher than singlefold to account for detection
problems, proof problems, and risk aversion.

II. THE DAMAGES FROM ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
Before the actual magnitude of the "treble damages" remedy can be
calculated, it is necessary to determine which antitrust violation effects should
be considered "damages." Then the effective payouts under the "treble
damages" remedy can be compared to the effects that should be termed
"damages." This methodology can determine whether damages are really
trebled.
Figure I illustrates (1) allocative inefficiency; and (2) the transfer -of wealth
from victims to the firm(s) with market power, the two most well-known
effects of the market power associated with most antitrust violations.

cartel member helped cause all of the damages attributable to the cartel, however, such
damages seem generally to be appropriate.
This Article's analysis does not consider claims not brought because of Rlinois Brick
problems, effects of undue plaintiff risk aversion caused by illegal activity, or free rider
problems that prevent antitrust suits from being filed. Nor does this Article attempt to
incorporate the effects of antitrust violations on corporate reputations. This Article's scope is
also limited to civil antitrust violations; the effects of criminal antitrust provisions are
omitted. Fmally, this Article assumes that the underlying substantive antitrust provisions are
sound. To the extent these factors could be proven, clarified, rebutted, or quantified, the
adjustments could, of course, affect this Article's conclusions significantly.
14 Part IV will utilize the deterrence and compensation frameworks modeled in Part ll.
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Figurel15
Allocative Inefficiency and Wealth Transfer Effects of Market Power
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Triangle DER in Figure I represents the allocative inefficiency effects of
monopoly power. Rectangle PtDRPo represents the transfer of wealth from
consumers of the product to the firm with monopoly power. Allocative
inefficiency represents suboptimal use of societal resources as a result of
market power.16 While there is controversy over whether the transfer of wealth
from consumers to firms with market power constitutes a harm that the
antitrust laws were enacted to prevent, 17 there is consensus in the courts and

15 Figure I is taken from BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 10.
16 The reason why monopoly power causes a suboptimal use of societal resources is
relatively straightforward:
To raise prices a monoJX>ly reduces output from the competitive level. The goods
no longer sold are worth more to woul<H>e purchasers than they would cost society to
produce. This foregone production of goods worth more than their cost is pure social
loss and constitutes the "allocative inefficiency" of monoJX>ly. For example, suppose that
widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production plus a competitive
profit). Suppose a monoJX>list would sell them for $2.00. A potential purchaser who
would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00 level. Because
a competitive market would have sold the widgets for less than they were worth to him,
the monoJX>list's reduced production has decreased the consumer's satisfaction without
producing any countervailing benefits for anyone. This pure loss is tenned "allocative
inefficiency." For an extended discussion and formal proof that monoJX>lY pricing
creates allocative inefficiency, see E. MANSFIElD, MICROECONOMICS: THEoRY AND
.APPilCATIONS 277-92 (4th ed. 1982).

Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Cmning) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
.ANm'RUSTBULL. 429,433-34 n.17 (1988).
17 For the contrasting sides, see Lande, supra note 16, at 458-65.
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the remainder of the antitrust community that allocative inefficiency (sometimes
termed "deadweight welfare loss") is undesirable. 18 Moreover, some or all of
the transfer, instead of becoming monopoly profits, may be consumed by
inefficient rent-seeking behavior.I9
Market power also can lead to higher prices (and the resulting wealth
transfers and allocative inefficiency) for goods or services not sold by the
violator(s). Significant monetary damages generally arise only in cases in which
market power is required20 or presumed,21 so many violators in these cases22
also affect the prices of their competitors. These "umbrella" effects of antitrust
violations can be significant.23 By analogy, OPEC never produced or sold as
much as seventy percent of the free world's oil supply, yet it affected oil prices
throughout the world.24 This cartel even affected the prices of fuels that could
substitute for oil to a degree, such as coal and natural gas.2S

18Jd.

19 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 11-12. Monopoly power can

also lead to

suboptimal quality, variety, and choice. See Alan FISher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency
Ccnsiderations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1634-35 (1983). It also can
permit firms to raise rivals' costs. See Thomas Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 16 Goo. L.J. 241 (1987).
20 Monopolization cases, for example, require market power. See irifra notes 160-66.
21 Many violations not requiring proof of market power, such as cartelization, lack this
requirement because market power is almost always present and its proof would be
wasteful.
22 Some violations, such as mergers, require only incipient market power. See FISher
& Lande, supra note 19, at 1591. These cases are less likely to give rise to significant
monetary damages.
23 For an excellent discussion of umbrella effects and a sophisticated argument that
they should be counted as antitrust damages, see William H. Page, The Scope of Liability
for Antitrust Vzolations, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1465-67 (1985).
24 See MoHAMMED E. AHRAru, OPEC: THE FAH..ING GIANT 203 (1986) (maximum
OPEC share of noncommunist world production was 68% in 1974; maximum OPEC share
of world production was 55.5% in 1973).
2S One author described this impact as follows:
The depressing effects of the oil crisis on the economy are underestimated in the
projections to the extent that they make no allowance for price increases in other fuels
that are competitive with oil. Prices of coal and natural gas have risen with oil prices.
While on a BTU equivalent basis, the importance of these two fuels is comparable to
that of oil, the aggregate importance of increases in their prices has not been nearly so
great. Much of natural gas production is price-controlled, and both coal and gas are
generally sold under long-tenn contracts. As time passes, price increases for these two
alternative fuels will become increasingly significant to the aggregate economy. For the
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Not only does the antitrust violation itself produce various damage effects,
but so too does the litigation necessary to recover damages and prevent future
occurrences. Attorneys' fees,26 other costs in pursuing and defending the
litigation (including the value of corporate employees' time), and the litigation's
inevitable costs to the judicial system can also be considered damages from the
violation. Moreover, each factor can affect income taxes paid and can therefore
affect American taxpayers.
Which of these effects should be considered "damages arising from an
antitrust violation"? The answer depends on whether the purpose of the remedy
is compensation or deterrence.

A. Using a Compensation Framework
The legislative history27 and case law28 indicate that compensation is a
goal, perhaps even the dominant goal, of antitrust's damages remedy.
future, the extent to which they rise will depend in part on policies still to be made,
particularly in the case of natural gas.
George L. Perry, The United States, in HIGHER OIL PRICES AND THE WORLD EcoNOMY:
THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM 102 (Edward R. Fried & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1975).
26 Theoretically, one could distinguish between attorneys' fees spent on antitrust
litigation in good faith from those spent unethically. Further, the existence of some actual
examples of anticompetitive conduct caused the antitrust laws to be enacted, thus opening
the way for erroneous suits by unharmed plaintiffs. Arguably, it would be fair to hold the
actual violators responsible for the attorneys' fees paid by the innocent defendants.
27 Senator Coke complained about a bill that would have provided only for double
damages:
How would a citizen who has been plundered in his family consumption of sugar
by the sugar trust recover his damages under that clause? It is simply an impossible
remedy offered him •••• [H]ow could the consumers of the articles produced by these
trusts, the great mass of our people-the individuals-go about showing the damages
they had suffered? How would they establish the damage which they had sustained so
as to get a judgment under this bill? I do not believe they could do it.
21 Cong. Rec. 2615 (1890).
Representative Webb stated that the damages provision "opens the door of justice in
every man whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws and gives the
injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914). He also
stated that "we are liberalizing the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual
who is damaged the right to get his damages anywhere-anywhere you can catch the
offender •••• " 51 Cong. Rec. 16274 (1914). See also the discussion in Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Gasses, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-30 (1989).
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Moreover, the underlying substantive provision's primary aim was to prevent
wealth transfers from victims to firms with market power29-a concept
analogous to that of compensating victims.30 The decision of Congress to
award "treble damages" might suggest that at least two-thirds of damages were
intended to be for punitive purposes or deterrence. It is possible, however, that
even this portion was intended to compensate plaintiffs for such unawarded
harms as the lack of prejudgment interest and such difficult to quantify damage
elements as the value of plaintiff's time expended pursuing the case.31
28 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("[The treble
damages remedy was passed] as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges
resulting from price fixing."). A large number of Supreme Court cases hold that both
deterrence and compensation are purposes of the treble damages remedy. See, e.g., Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 330 (1990); California v. ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989); American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 557 (1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); IDinois
Brick Co. v. Dlinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746, 748, 749 (1977); Fortner Enters. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
29 A summary of comments by legislators suggests congressional intent:
Congress was well aware . . . that higher prices transfer wealth from consumers to
firms with market power. The debates strongly suggest that Congress condemned trusts
and monopolies for exactly this reason. For example, Senator Sherman termed
monopolistic overcharges "extortion which makes the people poor," and "extorted
wealth." Congressman Coke referred to the overcharges as "robbery." Representative
Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest equivalent," have "stolen
untold millions from the people." Congressman Wilson complained that a particular
trust "robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other." Representative
Frthian declared that the trusts were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery."
Senator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose
of which is to extort from the community ... wealth which ought to be generally
diffused over the whole community." Senator George complained: They aggregate to
themselves great enonnous wealth by extortion which makes the people poor.
Lande, supra note 16, at 449-50 (footnotes omitted).
30 See generally BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3.
31 Professor Void explored this possibility:
In other words, closely analyzed, the threefold damage provision is remedial to the
plaintiff, compensatory in its nature in liquidating compensation for accumulative
intangible hann incurred outside of and beyond the ordinarily recoverable legal
damages to the business or property. It is a penalty upon the defendant only in the loose
sense of penalty as signifying a burden encountered by the defendant as a consequence
of his wrongdoing. In that broad sense of penalty this provision of course is a burden to
the defendant in requiring him to make compensation for damage wrongfully caused,
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If the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the "damages" caused by an
antitrust violation should consist of the sum of all relatively predictable harms
caused by that violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages
should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the violator(s), as well
as the allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, whether caused directly, or
indirectly via "umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the value of
plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the American taxpayer
of administering the judicial system should also be included.32 Attorneys' fees,
corporate time and other costs spent defending the case are not, of course,
harms to others and should not be a concern if the goal of the damages
provision is compensation to victims.
A compensation model should also consider the effects of federal and state
income taxes. Tax effects ameliorate some harms to potential plaintiffs from
antitrust violations and deprive them of some benefits of these violations. As
subpart ill(H) will demonstrate, these effects do not always cancel one another.
They will, therefore, be accounted for.

B. Using an Optimal Deterrence Framework
Virtually every analysis of antitrust damages issues assumes that the entire
purpose of the remedy provision is deterrence.33 This view finds support in the
relevant legislative history34 and case law,35 and draws support from the belief

comparable to the burden that is imposed by every provision which imposes legal
liability to make compensation to the injured party. The three-fold damage provision is
a provision for liquidated compensation for accumulative harm, largely intangible in its
nature, which is so conspicuous part of the loss suffered when a going business is
destroyed in violation of the anti-trust act.
Lawrence Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Antitrust Aa Penal or Compensatory?
28 KY. L.J. 117, 157-58 (1940).
Criminal penalties, including fines and prison, probably are better at deterrence. Thus
Congress's decision to award to plaintiffs the relief obtained could imply a compensation
goal.
32 See TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY, supra note 3, at 48-65.
33 For citations, see BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 3-28.
34 Senator Sherman observed that "the measure of damages, whether merely
compensatory, putative [sic], or vindictive, is a matter of detail depending upon the
judgment of Congress. My own opinion is that the damages should be commensurate with
the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described." 21
Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890). Representative Webb stated, "[u]nder the civil remedies any man
throughout the United States, hundreds and thousands, can bring suit in the variolJ!l
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that the major,36 or the exclusive,37 purpose of the underlying substantive
provisions is to enhance economic efficiency, the goal of optimal deterrence
models.38 Congress's decision to award treble damages could also imply that at
least part of their purpose is the deterrence of undesirable behavior.39
The issue of what should count as harm from an antitrust violation under
an optimal deterrence standard was once the subject of spirited debate within
the antitrust community. For example, Professor William Page concluded that
the transfer effects of market power should be the optimal measure for
calculating damages,40 while Professor Warren Schwartz concluded that the
allocative inefficiency caused by a violation should be its measure.4 1 But in
jurisdictions and thus the offender will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to
take money out of his pocket." 51 Cong. Rec. 16,275 (1914)
35 See cases cited supra note 28.
36 See Lande, supra note 16.
37 Robert Bork analyzed the relevant legislative history and concluded that "[t]he
whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss
in consumer welfare." ROBERT BoRK, THE ANrrrRUST PARADOX 91 (1978). Bork further
asserted that there was "not a scintilla of support" in the Act's legislative history for "broad
social, political, and ethical mandates." Id. at 10. Bork explicitly rejected distributive issues
as a possible area of congressional concern: "[Ilt seems clear the income distribution effects
of economic activity should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust
legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift in income distribution does
not lessen total wealth •••• " !d. at 111.
38 See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3.
39 Compare, however, the discussion accompanying notes 29-31.
40 See William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to
AntitnlSt Injury, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 467, 479 (1980). Professors Breit and Elzinga explain,
as follows:
[T]his is clearly wrong since ... the profit rectangle P1DRPo would be the
incorrect measure on which to base the damage judgment. This is true because of the
possibility that the cartel would generate cost savings. That is, the agreement among the
firms to collude might cause the firms to take into account technical diseconomies they
impose on each other. If so, the firm would not be deterred from engaging in the cartel
activity even when it imposes a deadweight loss on society in an amount greater than
the allocative efficiencies generated by the cartel. Thus a fine in the amount of the profit
rectangle P1DRPo would lead to under-deterrence.

BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
41 Warren F. Schwartz, An Oveniew of the Economics of AntitnlSI Eriforcement, 68
Goo. LJ. 1075, 1081-85 (1980). Breit and Elzinga explain as follows:
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recent years the antitrust community has generally accepted42 a standard
proposed by Professor William Landes of "the net harm to persons other than
the offender, "43 a standard similar or identical to one proposed by (then)
Professors Posner and Easterbrook of the monopoly profit rectangle plus the
allocative inefficiency (deadweight loss). A full explanation of why antitrust
damages should consist of "the net harm to persons other than the offender"
(adjusted by such factors as risk aversion and the probabilities of detection and
conviction) is complex,44 but the underlying intuition is relatively
straightforward.
[Professor Schwartz] suggests that the imposition of such a fine would be optimal
since it would require the offender to pay the complete social costs of his offense. If the
offender pays the amount DER back to society, and that is the full amount of its
inefficiency, how could there be any objection? Even if the profit rectangle PtDRPo is
greater than the deadweight loss DER, and the cartel continues to operate, society is
recompensed for any losses imposed on it. If the profit rectangle is less than the
deadweight loss, the finn will be deterred from the illegal activity.
But Schwartz's rule would be incom:ct if the cartelist's monopoly profits plus any
cost savings from cartelization are greater than the deadweight loss while the cost
savings alone are smaller than the deadweight loss. For in that case the cartelist would
continue to engage in collusive behavior. Yet the gain to society in savings would be
smaller than the deadweight loss. Once again there would be under-deterrence.
BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
42 See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 3-28 for citations.
43 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Cm. L. REv.
652, 656 (1983).
44 See id. Breit and Elzinga, referring to the diagram reprinted in this Article as Figure
I, explain as follows:

The trick to discovering the optimal sanction is to find a rule that will force the
potential cartelist to compare any cost saving from his activity with the deadweight loss
triangle. If the cost saving were larger than the deadweight loss, it would be in his (and
society's) interest to undertake the illegal activity. So after he deducts the monopoly
profit rectangle (which is only part of the fine to be paid under the Posner-Easterl>rook
rule), the cartelist will examine the deadweight loss (the remainder of the fine to be
paid) and compare it with the value of the cost saving. The fine that is the sum of the
deadweight triangle plus the profit rectangle is the com:ct sanction since it will
encourage the "right" amount of illegal antitrust activity. Damages larger than this (that
is, a fine larger than the area DER plus PJDRPo) could lead to over-deterrence, for in
that case the potential offender would be comparing the wrong magnitudes. After
paying the trapezoid P1DEPo. the remaining part of the fine to be paid would be
compared with the cost saving from the illegal activity. If it is larger than that amount,
the potential cartelist would be deterred from fonning the cartel. But this would be
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Optimal deterrence models are founded upon the assumption that the sole
goal of antitrust is to enhance economic efficiency.45 A horizontal restraint
producing market power, for example, would not be permitted if its cost
savings were less than the resulting allocative inefficiency. Defendants will
only be deterred from undertaking inefficient conduct if the cost of their
conduct is greater than the gain, the transfer due to the effects of market power
plus any cost savings from the venture. For example, if the arrangement
produced one dollar in transfer plus fifty cents in allocative inefficiency, it
should only be allowed if its cost savings exceeded fifty cents. Thus, the
optimal fine would be the sum of the transfer and the allocative inefficiency,46
or one dollar and fifty cents. If the arrangement produces more than fifty cents
in cost savings, it is net efficient47 and society wants it to proceed. Because the
venture can pay the fine out of its profits (the transfer plus the cost savings), it
will do so and the venture will continue. If the arrangement produces less than
fifty cents in cost savings, however, it is not net efficient48 and society does not
want it to proceed. Because the one-and-a-half dollar fine exceeds the venture's
total expected gain, the venture cannot afford the fine and so will not proceed.
Thus, the optimal fine is equal to the sum of the damages to others caused by
the arrangement. 49
incorrect from a social standpoint if the deadweight loss triangle were in fact less than
the cost saving •...
Therefore, the Posner-Easterbrook penalty causes the antitrust violator to compare
any efficiency gains of the violation to the deadweight loss to society. The antitrust
violator must be made to forgo his monopoly overcharge (rectangle P1DRPo) in order
to give him the proper incentives to make the correct comparison. Only a fine equal to
the total loss in consumers' surplus brings about this result
BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 11-12.
45 See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3. All the standard optimal deterrence models
assume that efficiency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust. Id. If one believes that another
purpose of antitrust is to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market
power (see Lande, supra note 16), then the transfer effects of market power, in addition to
the inefficiency effects, should be deterred. This type of deterrence model would be the
equivalent of the compensation model described in subpart II.A.
46 This fine must, of course, be adjusted for risk and the probability of detection and
conviction.
47 It is net efficient because the cost savings exceeds the $.50 in allocative inefficiency.
48 It is not net efficient because the allocative inefficiency of $.50 exceeds the cost
savings.
49 Breit and Elzinga explain further:
A numerical example may help to clarify the concept of the optimal antitrust
sanction. Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that joining a horizontal price-fixing
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Interestingly, Landes's focus upon net hann to others differs in only two
minor respects from the standard that should be employed under a
compensation approach. First, as noted earlier, an antitrust offense can give
rise to "umbrella" effects when, for example, a cartel raises prices throughout
an industry.SO If the cartel's competitors charge higher prices, allocative
inefficiency results-a hann to society undesirable under either a compensation
or deterrence perspective. These higher prices also cause a transfer of wealth
from consumers to the cartel's competitors. This transfer is not a net hann to
others, so Landes does not believe it should be included as a factor in an
optimal deterrence approach.5 1 Yet, these consumers are victims because they
are forced to pay prices elevated as an indirect result of the cartel. Their
welfare should, therefore, count under a compensation perspective.
In addition, the overcharge, lost time value of money and any resulting
damages award might have tax effects.52 Optimal deterrence's net hann to
conspiracy will increase his profits by $100 million. He also is aware that the
deadweight loss imposed on society by his activity is $50 million. If the expected value
of the fine imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus ($150 million) would he
enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the cartel would be accompanied by
cost reductions to him greater than $50 million. If the cost saving were, say, $60
million, he would still enter the price-fixing conspiracy because he would know that his
fine would be $100 million (his cartel profits) plus $50 million (the deadweight loss),
leaving him $10 million more revenue than would be the case if he did not enter the
cartel. In this case the cartel is accompanied by cost reductions greater than the
deadweight loss it imposes on society. On efficiency grounds, it should be pennitted.

BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 3, at 12.
50 See text accompanying notes 23-25.
51 See Landes, supra note 43, at 666-68. Landes's decision to omit these umbrella
effects from factoring into an optimal deterrence calculation has been insightfully and
thoughtfully criticized. See William H. Page, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 31
STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1490 (1.985). Moreover, Landes notes that it might sometimes be
appropriate to count these transfers:
Although the net benefit rule is perfectly general, the conclusion that the cartel
should not be liable for any overcharges on units sold by the competitive fringe holds
only under the cost conditions [described earlier]. If the fringe's marginal cost were to
exceed the previous competitive price, then their rents or benefits would be less than the
hann to consumers on the units purchased from the fringe. In the limit, if the fringe's
marginal cost were constant and equal to the cartel price, optimal damages would
equal ••• the entire overcharge plus the deadweight loss.
Landes, supra note 43, at 668.
52 See infra subpart m.H.
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others standard does not care how these losses or gains are shared between the
victims and the Treasury. Regardless who pays or obtains them, they should be
counted. Thus it is unnecessary to determine tax effects under an optimal
deterrence standard. If the concern is determining how much to compensate
injured victims, however, it does matter whether the Treasury pays part of the
victim's initial losses or removes some of their "treble" damages.
In summary, the "harms" from antitrust violations are only slightly
different regardless of whether the analysis employs a· deterrence or
compensation perspective. This Article will not attempt to determine which
approach better reflects the intent of Congress or which approach is superior;53
it will instead attempt to calculate estimates of the total harms caused by
antitrust violations from both perspectives. As the calculations in Part IV will
show, the results do not differ substantially. In either case, the "treble
damages" actually awarded are probably at most as large as the damages
caused by the violation.

ill. FACTORS NECESSITATING ADJUSTMENTS TO THE "TREBLE"
DAMAGES MULTIPLIER

This Part will calculate estimates for a number of types of disparities
between actual and awarded damages.54 Each is highly uncertain and subject to
many contingencies and caveats.55 To help account for some of this

53 It is unclear, moreover, whether we can fully separate deterrence and compensation
effects. If we do not adequately compensate plaintiffs, they might not bring enough suits to
deter violations optimally.
54 There are two general types of disparities between the damages caused by antitrust
violations and the damages typically awarded for them. The first consists of factors that
apply, to varying degrees, to most civil violations: the lack of prejudgment interest; statute
of limitations issues; the costs to the judicial system of handling the case; and the lack of
compensation for nonattorney time and expenses incurred as plaintiffs' employees pursue
the case. The second consists of factors relatively unique to antitrust offenses: the resulting
allocative inefficiency; the resulting umbrella effects; and, of course, the "treble" damages
plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees that are awarded.
55 The existing data do not, for example, allow us to know precisely such required
quantities as the length of the "average" antitrust case or the effect of the "average" cartel
or monopoly on the prices of other firms in its industry.
This Article, moreover, implicitly assumes that courts decide most cases correctly. If
Section 2 of the Sherman Act actually does more harm than good by discouraging hard
competition, single damages would certainly be more appropriate than treble damages for
these violations.
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uncertainty, and to rebut any inadvertent implication that the following figures
are precise, ranges, rather than point estimates, will generally be utilized.56

A. 1he Absence of Prejudgment Interest
Automatic interest on antitrust damages only accrues after judgment for
plaintiff.57 While the same is true for common-law suits,58 it has a greater
effect in the antitrust area because these cases usually take longer to resolve
than most others.59 During the period between the violation and judgment, the
victims of antitrust violations are deprived of this money while defendants
enjoy its use. The two sections in this subpart will attempt to calculate the
approximate average time lag involved and the time value of this money.

I. 1he Time Lag
The time lag consists of three possibly overlapping periods: (1) the
duration of the violation; (2) any delay between detection and filing; and (3) the
litigation period. These lags will be considered separately and then in
combination.

56 The author believes that these ranges are reasonably suggested by the existing data
and that they encompass the "true" figures. It must be stressed that every estimate that
follows is a "first cut" approximation without claim to scientific precision. The results of
this analysis should cast doubt on the assumption that damages are currently treble. The
analysis does not establish their "actual" level. The purpose of this exercise is to advance
the discussion over the "true" level of damages, not to end it.
57 15 U.S.C. § 15 does provide that interest can be awarded on untrebled damages
prior to judgment if the court finds the award to be just, considering such factors as delay
and violation of the rules. See generally Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-349, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 2716. Such awards are rarely made.
Even though prejudgment interest is almost never explicitly awarded, it can sometimes
be awarded implicitly as part of destroyed goodwill or the value of a business. It is possible
that a business destroyed through predation, for example, might be able to recover the
expected value of the business at the time of judgment, thus implicitly recovering a form of
prejudgment interest. Successful plaintiffs in suits involving cartel overcharges, however,
which are much more common than successful claims in monopolization cases, are much
less likely to be able to capitalize or figure out some other indirect method of recovering
lost prejudgment interest.
58 Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 406 (1921) (holding that even judgments
bear interest only if there is an appropriate statute).
59 Joseph F. Bradley, Comment: Critical Factual Assumptions Underlying Public
Policy, in PRIVATE ANrrrRUST LmGATION, supra note 3, at 253, 2~1.
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First, (then) Professor Posner found that during the 1960s the average
private antitrust conspiracy lasted approximately six years.60 Blackstone and
Bowman, analyzing Department of Justice Sherman Act Section 1 cases filed
during the 1970s, found that the average case lasted eight years.61 Professors
Gallo, Daw-Schmidt, Craycraft and Parker analyzed all Department of Justice
cases filed from 1963 to 1990 and found that the average duration of civil
antitrust violations was 8.4 years. 62 The average of these three estimates
suggests that the true average is probably between seven and eight years.63
Second, Professor Joseph Bradley, using data contained in the Georgetown
study of private antitrust litigation filed between 1973 and 1983, concluded that
on average two years pass from the time of injury to the filing of suit. 64 The
Gallo et al. study noted above found that the average time between the
discovery of the violation and the filing of a criminal antitrust suit was twentyseven months. 65 Blackstone and Bowman found that private "follow on" cases
were instituted two years after the government case ended. 66
The length of the delay between a violation and its discovery and the filing
of suit is likely to depend upon many factors, including the type of case
involved and the looming of the statute oflimitations.67 Because an experienced

60 Richard Posner, A Statistical Study ofAntitrust Erforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365,
401 (1970). Posner cautioned that not every conspiracy had the power to affect prices during
its entire length, and that some lapsed or collapsed and regrouped. Posner also found an
eleven year average for cases filed from 1950-54 and a seven year average for cases filed
from 1955-59. /d.
61 Edwin A. -Blackstone & Gary W. Bowman, Antitrust Damages: The Loss from
Delay, 32 .ANrrrRUSTBULL. 93, 95 {1987). The Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 (Supp. 1992).
62 See Joseph Gallo et al., A Preliminary Investigation of the First Century of
Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author; relevant statistics calculated by Dr. Gallo for author, letter on file with author)
(average duration of civil antitrust violation is 101 months (8.4 years)).There were 302 civil
cases in this sample. I am grateful to Professor Gallo et al. for providing this information
and allowing me to use it.
63 (6+8+8.4)/3 = 7.5 years.
64 See Brodley, supra note 59.
65 See Gallo et al., supra note 62. The sample contained 378 cases. A comparable
figure for civil cases is not available.
66 See Blackstone & Bowman, supra note 61.
67 The statute of limitations will be discussed infra at subpart ill.B.
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antitrust lawyer can usually file many types of cases within a few weeks,68 it is
probable that most of the "two-year delay" is caused by the victim not knowing
about the violation or hesitating to contact a lawyer. It is difficult to know how
long most violations continue while the potential plaintiff hesitated or before
the violation was discovered. Because much of the "two-year delay" would be
likely to overlap the violation period, a much shorter period is more
appropriate to use as a "net delay" estimate; a range from zero to six months
seems a more reasonable estimate.
Third, Professor Brodley further analyzed the data in the Georgetown
study and concluded that, on average, a private antitrust case lasted 4.5 years
from filing to judgment.69 Elzinga and Wood arrived at 4.3-year estimate.70
Blackstone and Bowman analyzed the 165 Department of Justice Section 1
antitrust cases filed during the 1970s in which the government prevailed and
found that the "average interval between the reported violation and the case's
outcome was 8.6 years. "71 Posner, analyzing private antitrust cases that went
to judgment during the 1960s, found average durations of 3.1 years for cases
that were disposed of in 1964, and 3.9 years for cases disposed of in 1%9.72
The average of these five figures is 4.9 years, but because the Blackstone and

68 An experienced lawyer might be able to assemble the information necessary to file
suit against a relatively straightforward cartel in a few weeks. The lawyer would be
unlikely, however, to file a monopolization case so quickly.
69 See generally Br<Xlley, supra note 59. Settlements took less time on average, but the
correct figure should be the interval between filing and judgement because the parties'
knowledge that judgment will probably take years is likely to influence the settlement. A
comparable figure for class action cases was not available because most settled, but it is
interesting to note that these cases took four years from filing until settlement. See id.
70 Kenneth G. Elzinga & William C. Wood, The Costs of the Legal System in Private
Antitrust Eriforcement, in PRivATE .ANrrrRUST LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 111 (fable 3.4).
Kauper and Snyder found that the average time between the filing of the first case in a
multidistrict litigation and the termination of the proceeding was 6.1 years. For multidistrict
litigations that were follow-ups to government cases the average elapsed time was 5.1 years;
for other cases it was 6.4 years. Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust
Cases that Follow On Government Cases, in PruvATE.ANrrrRUSTLmGATION, supra note 3,
at357.
71 See Blackstone & Bowman, supra note 61, at 95.
72 Richard Posner, A Statistical Study ofAntitrust Eriforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 363,
381 (1970). Different types of cases required different lengths of time. Monopolization
cases, for example, required an average of7.0 years. /d. at 406.
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Bowman estimate of 8.6 years seems anomalous, a 4.5-year estimate probably
would be more likely to be correct.73
Some cartels and other violations might fit an "average" sequential pattern
suggested by this data.74 A "typical" cartel might persist for seven to eight
years (ending either because it collapsed or was detected), followed by a
lawsuit filed an average of zero to one-half years later, followed by a judgment
four-and-one-half years later. The damages generated by this cartel might be
delayed for some eight to nine years prior to judgment.75 Other scenarios
consistent with the existing data also are reasonable,76 and the parameters for
other types of violations could be very different.77 Although the available data

73 Another reason why a slightly shorter average might be appropriate is that in recent
years courts appear to have been increasingly dismissing cases pursuant to summary
jud~entmotions.

74 Some violations might be less likely to fit this sequential pattern. A monopoly
achieved through predatory pricing or by activities that raise rivals' costs is, in contrast to a
cartel, much less likely to be judged illegal. Whereas naked cartels usually end upon
detection or the filing of suit, monopolies or more complex horizontal arrangements might
well continue until jud~ent (or appeal), especially if the owners are risk-seeking or
confident of final victory. Because some monopoly profits could be earned right up until
jud~ent in these cases, on average the damages caused by these violations would have
occurred closer to the date of jud~ent. Consider, for example, a monopolization scheme
that lasted seven years before detection. Suppose suit were filed two years thereafter,
followed by the average seven years of litigation until jud~ent, as calculated by Posner
(supra note 72, at 406) for monopolization cases. If the violator continued its practices until
jud~ent, the damages it caused would only be distanced from the jud~ent by
approximately half of the period over which the violation occurred, or 1/2 X + 2 + 1)
8 years on average.
15 That is, approximately [lh X
to 8)] + (0 to .5) + 4.~ = 8 to 9 years. A
mathematical complication arises because damages occurrj.ng throughout a 14-year period,
for example, are not precisely the equivalent of damages delayed for 7 years. For example,
$1.00 in damages per year during each of 14 years, increased at 7.69% per year, would
yield $25.38 by the end of the fourteenth year, an iilcrease of 81% on average. By contrast,
$1.00 increased at 7.69% per year for 7 years would increase by only 68%. The
methodology that this Article has chosen to use is relatively simple, but probably
underestimates the lost time value of money. It therefore might slightly overestimate the
final ratio of paid to actual damages.
76 For example, many cartels might be strongest nearer their beginning, causing fewer
damages towards their end. This could mean that the "average" damages caused by the
cartel would be more than halfway from jud~ent, and so should be adjusted more for the
lost time value of money.
77 See supra note 72.
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are incomplete and imprecise, they do suggest an average delay between
damages and judgment of between eight and nine years.

2. The Time Value ofMoney
The next issue is the appropriate rate to be used to account for the lost time
value of damages. 78 If compensation is the goal of antitrust, damages should
place the victims in the same position they would have occupied had no
violation occured. It is difficult to know, however, what would have happened
had the violation not occurred. For example, the victim might have invested the
money that it was forced to pay to the antitrust violator.79 Because the
transaction was involuntary, to be fair we should resolve doubts in favor of the
victim-perhaps using a figure equal to, or in excess of, the rate for new threemonth Treasury bills. Alternatively, suppose a victim had been harmed and
knew with certainty80 that it would recover from defendant in eight years. A
reasonable course of action for that victim might be to obtain an eight-year
loan8I for the amount of the damages. 82 Thus, under a compensation

78 The timing issue was less significant in the past, when interest rates were low. The
maximum rate for three-month U.S. Treasury bills, for example, was 1.1% during the
1940s and 3.4% during the 1950s. COUNCIL OF EcoNOMIC ADVISORS, EcoNOMIC REPoRT OF
THE PREsiDENT 368 (1991).
79 A victimized individual, for example, might have invested in particular types of
assets. Alternatively, a victimized business might have done the same, or might have
undertaken projects yielding even higher expected rates of return.
80 Lawyers rarely give antitrust advice with such certainty. See Harvey J. Goldschmid,
Comment on the Policy Implications of the Georgetown Study, in PRivATE ANrrrnUST
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 412.
81 A zero coupon bond would also be a good analogy.
82 If information were perfect, plaintiffs could go to their bankers and convince them
that, because the recovery in eight years was assured, the bank should extend an eight-year
loan at its most favorable rate. Because plaintiff or defendant bankruptcy during those eight
years for unrelated reasons would always be a possibility, however, the banker might not be
repaid even if plaintiff were guaranteed to prevail. And, of course, information is not
perfect, and no banker could be expected to believe plaintiff had a 100% chance of
recovery (even if this actually was warranted). The banker would likely extend the loan at a
rate that considered the particular plaintiff's and defendant's financial conditions at the time,
incorporating some probability (m the banker's opinion) that the plaintiff would not recover
treble damages in approximately eight years.
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perspective, an appropriate discount rate probably should equal or exceed the
prime interest rate. 83
If optimal deterrence is the goal of the remedy provision, the discount rate
should be viewed from defendant's perspective to focus on the gain to the
defendant from undertaking the violation. This analysis would again attempt to
ascertain whether the money that the violator gained was invested or whether it
enabled the violator to forego obtaining a loan. Defendants might otherwise
have foregone a loan at the prime interest rate or higher, or invested the money
in such items as risk-free Treasury bonds.84
In light of this uncertainty, in subsequent calculations this Article will use a
range of figures ranging from the three-month Treasury bill rate to the prime
interest rate. Because interest rates have varied considerably in recent years, 85
this section will use the average rate of the last twenty years. The average three
month Treasury bill rate for the last twenty years has been 7.69%.86 This
section will tentatively assume a low estimate of the effects of lost prejudgment
interest for a hypothetical overcharge of one dollar, delayed an average of eight
years, compounded at 7.69% per year (which yields $1.81). Alternatively, the
prime interest rate for the last twenty years has averaged 10.22%.87 This
section will tentatively assume a high estimate of the actual value of a

83 An even higher interest rate would be appropriate if the plaintiff were financially
less secure. Some believe that the defendant's payout should not depend upon the financial
condition of its victims. Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, JaTTis Joplin's Yearbook
and the Theory of Damages, 5 J. Accr., AUDITING, & FIN. 145, 146-48 {1990). In tort
litigation, however, defendants "take the victims as they find them," and might pay more if
the victim is relatively wlnerable. See EDWARD J. KlONKA, TORTS: INruruEs TO PERsONS
AND PROPERTY 359 (1977). It seems reasonable to make antitrust damages paid depend
upon actual damages caused.
84 This Article's use of the three-month Treasury bill rate is conservative because it
includes no risk premium. An important reason why actual damages should be trebled is to
take all risks of noncollection into account, including the risk of defendant bankruptcy and
the risk that the violation will go undetected. Risk should already be accounted for in the
"trebling" aspect of the multiplier; whether it actually does so is open to dispute. Because
risk arguably should not affect the interest rate, the virtually risk-free three-month Treasury
bill rate might be an appropriate yardstick for the time value of money.
85 The prime interest rate during recent years has ranged, for example, from 18.87%
(1981) to 6.83% (1977). See CoUNCIL OF EcoNOMIC ADVISORS, EcoNOMIC REPoRT OF THE
PREsiDENT 378 (1992) (fable B-71).
86 /d. This figure is an average of the average yearly rates for 1972 through 1991. The
most recent ten-year period average is 7.59%. /d.
87 /d.
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hypothetical overcharge of one dollar compounded at the rate of 10.22% per
year for nine years (which yields $2.40).
There is, however, an important reason why this range might be
inappropriate. As the next subpart shows, some of the early years of an
antitrust violation are often immunized from damage payouts by the four-year
statute of limitations for private damage actions. For this reason, the actual
period between damages and judgment is on average probably lower than eight
to nine years. The next subpart will take the statue of limitations into account
and make appropriate adjustments. 88

B. Effects ofthe Statute ofLimitations
Section 4 (b) of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny action to enforce any
cause of action under sections [4 and 4(a)] of this title shall be forever barred
unless [it commences] within four years after the cause of the action
accrued. "89 Because cartels probably last an average of seven to eight years,9°
many violations that are detected91 run longer than the statute of limitations and
are therefore detected too late for recovery of damages.
If, as the previous subpart estimated, a conspiracy lasted for seven to eight
years and was followed by a zero to one-half year delay before suit was filed,
the four-year statute of limitations would immunize the first 3 to 4.5 years of
damages caused by the violation. 92 The statute of limitations might immunize
an average of thirty-eight to sixty-four percent of the damages caused by the
conspiracy. 93
The actual percentage of damages immunized by the statute of limitations
is, however, likely to be less than this range. The four-year statute of
limitations starts to run at the occurrence of every act that violates the antitrust
laws, such as an agreement to fix prices, but is not generally affected by
subsequent "routine" activities that the violators undertake to carry out their

88 Tax considerations

also affect the actual amount of the interest that plaintiffs or
defendants will be able to keep. See supra subpart ill.H.
89 IS U.S.C. § ISb (Supp. 1992).
90 See supra subpart ill.A.
9l Many violations are not detected at all, so their perpetrators pay no damages.
This
c
Article will make no attempt to account for this fuct, other than to note that a primary
reason why antitrust damages are automatically trebled is that the violations are frequently
difficult to detect. See supra note 1 for rough estimates of the percentage of certain
violations that are detected.
92 Calculated as follows: (/ to 8) + (0.0 to 0.5) - 4 = 3 to 4.5.
93 Calculated as follows: (3 to 4.5) I(/ to 8) = 38% to 64%.
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illegal agreements, such as charging supracompetitive prices, cashing checks,
or delivering goods or services.94 Nor is there a federal exception for
continuing conspiracies.95 The statute of limitations can, however, be tolled in
two relevant ways.96
First, government antitrust proceedings can toll the statute of limitations.97
Kauper and Snyder reported that nine percent of the cases studied in the
Georgetown sample were follow-on cases to government actions98 and that
more recently this figure dropped to six percent.99 Follow-on cases were
dismissed less frequently, however, and twelve percent of the cases in the
Georgetown sample that were litigated to a conclusion were follow-up cases.1oo
Perhaps this factor should cause no adjustment to the percentage of damages
immunized by the statute of limitations. tot Alternately, if twelve percent of the
cases in which damages are obtained followed government cases, the damages
lost to plaintiffs because of the statute of limitations should be reduced, so only
thirty-three to fifty-six percent of damages would be lost because of the statute
of limitations. 102
The second major exception to the statute of limitations arises when an
antitrust violation is fraudently concealed. Although the parameters of this
doctrine are unclear and vary among circuits, 1°3 generally silence by the

94 See Robert Brina, Comment, Complexities of Accrual: The Antitrust Statute of
Limitations in a Contractual Context, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1073-74 (1983); see also
ABA ANrrrR.UST SECI'ION, ANrrrR.UST L. DEV. 682-83 (3d ed. 1992).
95 Brina, supra note 94.
9 6 For other relatively minor exceptions, see A.B.A. ANrrrRUST SECI'ION, supra note
94, at 680-97. For example, some state antitrust laws have no statute of limitations. See,
e.g., Ohio ex rei. Brown v. Klosterman French Baking Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCII),
61,361 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (Ohio antitrust law has no statute of limitations).
97 For a discussion, see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECI'ION, supra note 94, at 683-88; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 16 (i) (1976) (statute of limitations tolled by filing of certain government
suits and for one year thereafter).
98 Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on
Government Cases, in PRivATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 329, 333.
9 9 Jd. at 332.
100Jd. at 343.
101 Cartels stop for many reasons, including the filing of a government suit. This fact
should be reflected in the 7.5-year average cartel duration calculated in subpart m.A.1, and
there is no reason to believe that cartels persist once a government suit is filed.
102 Calculated as follows: (38% to 64%) x .88 = (33% to 56%).
103 See W. Glenn Opel, Note, A Reevaluation ofFraudulent Concealment and Section
4B of the Qayton Act, 68 TEx. L. REv. 649 (1990); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECI'ION,
supra note 94, at 689-93.
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defendant is not enough to show fraud. Most courts have held that affirmative
acts of concealment by the defendant must be shown for the plaintiff to invoke
the doctrine successfully.l04
It might be impossible to determine how often this doctrine plays a role in
antitrust damages actions.1os Fraudulent concealment claims do not appear to
be raised in the vast majority of antitrust cases when the statute of limitations
might be an issue, 106 but such claims appear to be successful approximately
sixty percent of the time they are decided on the merits.1°7 If fraudulent
concealment applied in sixty percent of the relevant cases, 108 only from thirteen
to twenty-six percent109 of antitrust damages would be lost because of statute of
limitations problems.llO This range roughly corresponds to the first one to two
years of a violation's damages.111

104 See generally
105

A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECI'ION, supra note 94, at 689-90.
See generally PHILIP C. JONES, LITIGATING PruvATE ANTITRUST ACI'IONS 385

(1984).
106 A computer-assisted search of all U.S. district court cases mentioning "Clayton
Act" and "statute of limitations" found that 179 out of 764, or 23%, also mentioned
"fraudulent concealment." The comparable figure for courts of appeals cases was 58 out of
333, or 17%. Of course the mere mention of the term does not make the case a "fraudulent
concealment" case or "statute of limitations" case. Nor does it mean that either doctrine was
successfully invoked.
107 Of the 58 appellate court cases (see supra note 106), only 35 decided whether the
doctrine was applicable in an antitrust case. Fraudulent concealment was found to exist in
21, or 60%, of the cases that decided the issue.
108 This estimate is probably conservative. Although fraudulent concealment claims
appear to be successful 60% of the time the issue was decided, they were only mentioned in
23% of cases discussing the statute of limitations. See supra note 106. Some of the Tl% of
the cases mentioning "statute of limitations" but not "fraudulent concealment" undoubtedly
did not discuss fraudulent concealment because plaintiff had no reasonable basis for alleging
the issue.
109 This range is based upon the high and low figures calculated earlier in this subpart.
110 Calculated as follows: .40 x (33% to 64%) = 13% to 26%. It matters relatively
little whether the first year or two of damages is viewed as immunized by the statute of
limitations or merely delayed, because these damages accrue so many years prior to
judgment that they are worth little by the time judgment is rendered. The estimates in this
Article show that the initial year of damages might be removed from judgment by roughly 8
+ .5 + 4.5 = 13 years. Using the prime interest rate as a discount rate, the initial year's
damages of$1.00 would be worth only $.28 at judgment.
111 Subpart ID.A calculated an average delay of eight to nine years from the
imposition of antitrust damages to judgment, and the earliest period of damages is of course
more likely to be barred by the statute of limitations. If we assume that the first one to two
years of damages typically are lost because of the statute of limitations, this assumption
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Because of the uncertainty involved, this subpart will expand this range
slightly and assume that approximately ten to thirty percent of the damages are
immunized by the statute of limitations. It will also assume that the remainder
of the damages are recoverable, but are delayed for seven to eight years112
prior to judgment instead of the eight to nine years calculated in subpart ill(A).
Because $1.00 compounded annually at 7.69% for seven years yields $1.68
and $1.00 compounded annually at 10.22% for eight years yields $2.18, this
subpart will assume that lost damages should be increased to a range of $1.68
to $2.18 to account for lost prejudgment interest.

C. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Salop and White's analysis of the Georgetown data sample concluded that
awarded attorneys' fees were, on average, the equivalent of approximately ten
to twenty percent of the monetary awards (that is, roughly thirty to sixty
percent of the untrebled transfer).113 Elzinga and Wood's analysis produced a
significantly higher range.ll 4 Because plaintiff and defendant attorneys' fees for
each party are approximately equal, 115 it probably is appropriate to assume that
plaintiffs pay their lawyers at least an average11 6 of thirty to sixty cents to bring
a lawsuit in which one dollar in transfer is obtained (and trebled).117
would imply a (1 to 2)/ (/to 8) (the average length of a cartel) = a 12% to 29% reduction
in damages attributable to the statute of limitations-virtually identical to the 13% to 26%
range calculated earlier. This immunization of the first one to two years of damages means
that the average delay between the imposition of recognizable damages and judgment would
be less than the eight to nine-year estimate calculated in subpart m.A. A net figure for the
life of an average cartel that would give rise to recognizable antitrust damages would only
be (/ to 8) - (1 to 2) = 5 to 7 years. This calculation suggests that the average delay
between the imposition of damages and judgment would be (5 to 7)/2 + (0 to .5) (filing lag)
+ 4.5 (litigation duration) = 7 to 8.5 years on average.
112 The high estimate of 8.5 years, supra note 111, was reduced to eight to be
conservative, because it seems unlikely that all of the factors implying a long time lag would
occur.
113 See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust litigation:
Introduction and Framework, in PRivATE ANTrrnUST LmGATION, supra note 3, at 13 (using
court data and a confidential data set).
114 Elzinga and Wood estimated a range of .58 to 1.02 times the recovery. Elzinga &
Wood, supra note 70, at 107, 126 (using a confidential data set).
liS Salop & White, supra note 113, at 15.
116 Of course, this average range includes radically different cases. One extreme can
be illustrated by United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). Although plaintiff received only $1.00
before trebling, it also received over $5,000,000 in attorneys' fees. The other extreme is
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Most of these fees are likely to be paid years before the date of judgment.
Although the judgment may reimburse a successful plaintiff the nominal dollars
paid to counsel, plaintiff nevertheless will lose the time value of this money
during the lag between the payment of the fees and the date of judgment
because plaintiffs are not awarded interest on their attorneys' fees. 118 It is
difficult to ascertain whether plaintiffs or their lawyers lose as a result of this
effect. Fee arrangements providing that plaintiffs' attorneys will get a
contingent fee in addition to the court-awarded "reasonable" attorneys' fees can
mean that plaintiffs, not their attorneys, will absorb this loss. 119 For deterrence
purposes, this division is unimportant because in either case it is an
unrecovered loss resulting from the antitrust violation. If we are interested in
compensating victimized plaintiffs, however, this division becomes important.
Because this author was unable to estimate how much of the recovery plaintiffs'
attorneys typically receive in addition to their court-awarded attorneys' fees,
this Article's decision not to adjust for this factor might have the effect of overestimating the effective recovery to plaintiffs.I20
Because the average time lag until judgment is substantial, it should be
taken into account. Using the estimates of the average time lags and interest
rates calculated in subpart ID(A) above, the approximate expected cost to
plaintiffs of their legal fees increases to between thirty-five (low estimate) and
seventy-four (high estimate) percent of the untrebled transfer.I2 1 Thus, if
illustrated by an unidentified cash settlement in favor of plaintiffs of $50,000,000, which
required only $150,000 in plaintiff attorneys' fees (a 0.003 ratio of fees to settlement). See
Elzinga & Wood, supra note 70, at 123.
117 This range is, of course, subject to great uncertainty. As Elzinga and Wood
caution: "It is unlikely ••• that any one figure characterizing the distributional efficiency of
private antitrust could emerge unchallenged because the calculations are senstive to the
method of computation." Elzinga & Wood, supra note 70, at 126.
118 "Reasonable" attorneys' fees are normally set using a variation of the "lodestar"
approach, which does not include any compensation for the lost time value of paid
attorneys' fees. See JoNES, supra note 105, at 548-54.
119 See Kevin F. Kelly, Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Qass Action Antitrust
litigation, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1656, 1658-59 (1972) (discussing cases holding that such
contracts are legal). See generally John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee
Awards-, 90 YALEL.J. 473 (1981).
120 If the courts typically fix attorneys' fees that were reasonable at the time they
accrued, it is reasonable to assume that plaintiffs' attorneys would protect themselves from
the lost time value of their fees through mechanisms such as contingent fee arrangements.
121 Section m.A.1 concluded that on the average there was as much as a .5 year gap
between detection and filing, and another 4 or 4.5 years of litigation. If 1/3 of the attorneys'
fees were incurred 4 years before judgment, 1/3 were incurred 2 years before judgment,
and 1/3 immediately before judgment, and if a low estimate of a 7.69% annual interest rate
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plaintiffs paid their attorneys thirty to sixty cents times the transfer in attorneys'
fees and were later awarded this nominal amount by the court, they would be
short .05 to .14 times the transfer because of the lost time value of their
money.
This difference is undoubtedly not the only one between court-awarded
attorneys' fees and costs and the actual attorneys' fees and costs that plaintiffs
must expend. Other differences can arise from statutory expert witness and
other cost-fixing provisions, 122 and contingent fee agreements requiring
plaintiffs to pay their lawyers fees beyond those awarded by the court so that
plaintiffs can obtain effective counsel.l 23 Moreover, the .05 to .14 gap was
calculated using Salop and White's relatively low estimates of the probable
range of attorneys' fees; Elzinga and Wood's larger estimates would produce a
significantly larger discrepancy. 124 To account somewhat for these factors, the
gap will be widened to .05 to .20, a range that could well be low.
In summary, it seems likely that plaintiffs are not fully reimbursed for all
their legal expenses. This subpart will assume that, on the average, courtawarded attorneys' fees and costs are thirty to sixty percent of the transfer
effects of market power, but that actual plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs are
approximately thirty-five to eighty percent of the transfer. This assumption
means that plaintiffs on average pay as attorneys' fees and costs a net
unreimbursed amount equivalent to between five and twenty percent of the
transfer.

is used (see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text), on average the legal fees should be
increased by 17% to account for the lost time value of money. Legal fees of .30 times the
transfer would be increased to .35 times the transfer. A higher estimated adjustment, using
the 10.22% annual interest rate calculated supra in section ill.A.2, would mean that the fees
should be increased by 23%, from .60 up to .74 times the transfer. See supra notes 79-87
and accompanying text.
122 See generally Note, Redefining the "Cost of Suit" Under Section Four of the
Gayton Act, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1905 (1984).
123 Some of these adjustments are more likely to apply to suits by consumers, others to
suits by businesses. Another complication arises because Section 4 of the Clayton Act
mandates the award of attorneys' fees for successful civil antitrust judgments, but not for
settlements. Thus, the "only basis for awarding an attorney's fee in such cases is the
equitable fund theory doctrine, which may be used to 'make fair and just allowances for
expenses and counsel fees to [those] parties promoting litigation•..• "' City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Trustees v. Greenough, 105
U.S. 527, 537 (1881)). In other words, plaintiffs' attorneys obtain part of the settlement.
124 See supra notes 113-14.
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D. Other Plaintiff Costs of Pursuing the Case
In addition to the actual victory or defeat, a corporation's involvement in
an antitrust action is likely to affect it in other ways, usually for the worse. For
example, the prospect of supracompetitive profits gives plaintiffs and
defendants an incentive to engage in wasteful offensive or defensive "rent
seeking" behavior, 125 and it is possible that victims or potential victims of
antitrust actions will become unduly risk averse. 126 Most of these potential
costs of antitrust violations are extremely difficult to measure.
There is, however, one effect of a violation and its subsequent litigation
that lends itself to rough partial quantification. It is common for corporate
employees to spend significant amounts of time pursuing antitrust litigation.127
This investment includes time spent conferring with lawyers, assembling
necessary documentation, testifying, and responding to the inevitable requests
from the other parties.12s
The Georgetown private damages study asked a sample of corporate
officials how long they spent pursuing their antitrust cases. The 225 officials
who responded reported spending an average of 203 hours of executive time
per case.129 This figure does not include administrative or nonexecutive time,

125 See Richard Posner, 1he Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL.
Ea:>N. 807 (1975); PosNER, supra note 3, at 4-11. Similarly, a cartel or monopoly often
must expend resources to protect its position. !d.
126 Many also believe that organizational slack, or X-inefficiency, often results from
monopoly power. See Harvey Liebenstein, A/locative Efficiency vs. "X- Efficiency," 56 AM.
Ea:>N. REv. 392 (1966). To the extent that plaintiffs are awarded three times defendants'
supracompetitive profits, monopolies and cartels have an incentive to be lazy or inefficient.
Lower supracompetitive profits could mean a lower eventual payout, so victims could end
up paying threefold for defendants' laziness and inefficiency.
127 Individual cases vary remarkably for many reasons, including the fact that
corporate time spent on a case can often substitute for attorney time.
128 Antitrust cases often require the attention of top corporate executives who are
prevented from exploiting other corporate opportunities or formulating or carrying out
strategic plans. Several clients have told the author that, when they are deciding whether to
file an antitrust suit, these corporate costs are a larger impediment than the cost of their
attorneys' fees. Moreover, plaintiffs are required to mitigate damages, and these efforts are
not compensated by the judgment.
129 This figure was calculated from the material presented in Paul V. Teplitz, 1he
Georgetown Project: An Overview ofthe Data Set and its Collection, in PRIVATE ANrrrRUST
LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 73. Only a small percentage of lawyers responded to the
survey, so this data set must be used with more caution than most of the data relied upon in
this Article.
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corporate overhead or direct expenses, Board of Directors time, in-house
counsel time, time wasted because of disruption of employees routine, or time
spent by employees discussing the case. 130 If the executive time is valued at
$100.00 per hour131 and the result is doubled or tripled to account for the
omitted corporate time, overhead, and expenses, the "average" lawsuit would
cost the corporation $40,600 to $60,900.132 Because the average litigation cost
for this same sample of cases was $77,000, 133 the lost corporate time and
expenses might cost the corporation approximately fifty-three to seventy-nine
percent as much as the attorneys' fees. Subpart ill(C), above, calculated that
attorneys' fees cost approximately thirty-five to eighty percent of the "average"
transfer effects of market power.1 34 Under these assumptions the lost corporate
time and expenses would constitute from nineteen to sixty-three percent of the
transfer.135
This range is uncertain for many reasons, 136 including its reliance upon a
relatively small and possibly atypical sample of cases reporting corporate time

130 /d. Nor does it include the "water cooler" effects of significant antitrust cases.
Corporate personnel often spend considerable time speculating about the course of a case
and its effects upon the company's future and their careers.
131 In 1979 the average attorney fee awarded in antitrust class actions was calculated to
be $115.00 per hour. Robert B. Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEO. LJ. 1053, 1069
n.42 (1980).
132 Calculated as follows: $100 x 203 x (2 or 3) = $40,600 to $60,900.
133 Teplitz, supra note 129, at 71 (average of$45,000 and $109,000).
134 This calculation uses attorney fee estimates increased to adjust for the lost time
value of money. The lost corporate time and expenses should be similarly adjusted.
135 Calculated as follows: (53% to 79%) x (35% to 80%) = 19% to 63%.
136 Stephen Susman cautions that the complexities involved are enormous:
My experience has been that there is a certain "fixed cost" of pursuing just about
any lawsuit, regardless of the amount in controversy or the size of the company. To that
extent, the amount of company investment is disproportionately large in small cases, but
becomes less and less significant as the amount of actual damages increases, even on a
single damage measure. At the same time, this factor changes with a number of random
variables, including the executive's commitment to the lawsuit (something that often has
nothing to do with the merits); the involvement of the company's law department in the
litigation; whether the officers are named individually; the ratio of the damages sought
to the net worth of the company; whether the charges outrage the executives (for
instance, in an antitrust lawsuit with RICO claims)-and I am sure there are other
factors.
Letter from Stephen Susman, an extremely experienced antitrust attorney, to Robert Lande
(April30, 1987) (on file with author).
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spent on antitrust cases.137 It surely does not apply to consumer class action
suits, because the total value of lost consumer time from an antitrust violation
would usually be de minimis.138 Nevertheless, for the reasons given at the
beginning of this subpart, this range probably includes only a small portion of
the noncompensable time and expenses consumed by the prospect of an
antitrust violation, the violation itself, and the subsequent litigation. This
Article will round these estimates and, to account for uncompensated victim
time and expenses, assume a low adjustment of twenty percent of the transfer
and a high adjustment of sixty-five percent. This range will be used in the
subsequent calculations.

E. 1he Costs ofthe Judicial System
Every antitrust case entails unreimbursed costs to the judicial system that
directly harm the taxpayer and society as a whole. Although every party is
entitled to a fair trial, and it would be unfair to consider defendants
"responsible" for the costs in cases in which they ultimately prevail, the
judicial costs involved in obtaining an award for the victorious plaintiff are as
necessary and inevitable as attorneys' fees, and should therefore be considered
another damage from antitrust violations.139
A 1979 Federal Judicial Center study (the most recent available) indicated
that federal district court judges spent approximately 4.1% of their time on
civil antitrust cases not involving the federal govemment. 140 There is no

137 See Elzinga & Wood, supra note 70, at 110. This Article's analysis assumes that
defendant's expenses are the same as those of the plaintiff; the Georgetown study does not
specify whether the responses are from plaintiffs or defendants. Teplitz, supra note 129, at
73. No losses are assumed for the fringe firms or the allocative inefficiency multiplier.
138 If these calculations were performed solely for consumers, an estimate of zero
would be appropriate. A separate analysis of consumer class action suits could reveal other
differences.
139 Even if we assume that all defendant losses were "close calls" contested in good
faith, the court costs are nevertheless damages from the violation. The taxpayers, through
their representatives who established the court system, have decided to absorb this cost
rather than assess it against the losing party. Nevertheless, if the violation had not occurred,
taxpayers would not have incurred these costs. Professor Landes believes that optimal
deterrence requires that all enforcement costs that are a net damage to others, such as costs
of judicial administration, should be considered as damages from antitrust violations.
Landes, supra note 43, at 653, 657
140 See STEvEN FLANDERS, 1979 DISTRicr COURT TIME STuDY (1980), dted in Reich,
supra note 131, at 1069, and Brodley, supra note 59, at 261. Table 16 of the Flanders study
reports that judges spent 5.4% ·of their time on civil antitrust cases. John Shapard, Project
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comparable data available for federal court of appeals judges or magistrates,
but it is not unreasonable to expect at least a comparable figure.1 41 Under this
approach the average total cost to the judicial system of handling antitrust cases
would be approximately $40,000.142
This approach, however, includes certain fixed and indirect costs of
maintaining the judiciary that would remain even if the antitrust laws were
repealed, so it might be more appropriate to figure the judicial cost per antitrust
case on more of an incremental basis. This method yields $21,000 per case.143

Director, Research Division, Federal Judicial Center, in a telephone conversation with the
author on July 29, 1992, stated that an in-progress study showed that federal district judges
spent a much smaller percentage of their time on antitrust cases, although the sample size
probably was too small to have statistical significance.
141 It certainly is possible that circuit courts devote a higher percentage of their time to
antitrust. In 1991, 20.2% of all civil cases in federal courts were appealed. Of the 681
antitrust cases, 190, or 27.9%, were appealed. L. RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1 ANNuAL REPoRT OF
THE DIRECTOR 56, App. I at 16 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ANNuAL REPoRT]. Moreover,
Shapard, supra note 140, reports that the ongoing Federal Judicial Center Study shows that
federal magistrates spend more time on antitrust cases than federal district court judges.
142 The total cost to the taxpayers of administering these courts in 1990 (the 1990 cost
rather than the 1979 cost is used to take account of inflation) was $1.361 billion. L. RALPH
MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINlSTRATIVE
OFFICE, REPoRT OF THE DIRECTOR 3 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 REPoRT]. These costs should
be allocated to the 1,234 private antitrust actions filed in 1979. See Brodley, supra note 59,
for citations. Cases usually last for more than one year, but their judicial costs are incurred
over several years. Thus, (4.1% x $1,361 billion) /1,234 cases would equal an average cost
to the taxpayer per antitrust case of some $45,000. However, the size of the federal
judiciary bas grown by approximately 10% during the last decade. 1991 ANNuAL REPoRT,
supra note 141, at 3, 7 and 43. Accordingly, an estimate 10% lower, $40,000 per case,
would probably be more appropriate.
143 The direct recurring costs of maintaining federal judgeships as of January 1, 1991
is an estimated $641,000 for circuit court judges, $605,000 for district court judges,
$428,000 for federal magistrates, and $334,000 for senior status district court judges (a
comparable figure for senior status circuit court judges is not available; it will be assumed to
be equal to that for senior status district court judges) (figures supplied by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Budget Division, on file with the author).
In 1990 these positions were occupied by approximately 158, 531, 484, 201, and 63 people
respectively, producing a total cost to the U.S. taxpayer of $718 million. 1990 REPoRT,
supra note 142, at 8, 9. The federal judiciary has grown by approximately 10% during the
past decade, 1991 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 141, at 3, 7, 43, so it might be appropriate
to reduce the cost per case comparably. Thus, (4.1% x $718 million x 90%) I 1234 =
$21,000 per case.
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This estimate of $21,000 per case would, according to the Georgetown
study,144 represent 5.5%of the average plaintiff award. Because these awards
trebled the transfer effects of market power, the cost of judicial administration
is approximately sixteen percent of the transfer effects of market power.145
There is, however, one reason why this estimate might understate the
average judicial cost associated with a plaintiff victory. Significantly more
defendant victories than plaintiff victories are achieved early, 146 and the judicial
costs for the average plaintiff victory may well be closer to those for the
average antitrust case that reaches judgment. This figure can also be
approximated as forty percent of the transfer effects of antitrust violations.147
There are other reasons, however, why this estimate may be too high.
While it is probably irrelevant that the total number of antitrust cases has
dropped dramatically since 1979,148 it is significant that the average amount of
judicial time spent per antitrust case probably has dropped in recent years. In
many areas, including monopolization149 and RPM, 15° summary judgment
motions are more likely to be granted against antitrust plaintiffs, and in general
criminal cases involving illegal drugs are tending to crowd civil cases off of

144 The average plaintiff award was $380,903 for the Georgetown sample's 1973-83
cases. Teplitz, supra note 129, at 77. The median plaintiff award was $153,416. ld.
145 This figure only includes judicial costs as a percentage of plaintiff awards. It omits
consideration of judicial costs in cases in which the defendant wins.
146 Teplitz, supra note 129, at 74.
147 The average trial length of 11.4 days, Brodley, supra note 59, at 260, x $605,000
($605,000 is the average recurring annual cost of a federal district court judgeship; see
supra note 143) 1135 (the average number of trial days per judge per year; id.) = $51,000
per case. $51,000 divided by $380,903 (see supra note 144 for the average award in an
antitrust case) = 13.4%; trebled, this figure is 40%. Alternatively, the approximate cost of
a day of a civil jury trial is $2,711. (Figure supplied by Budget Development Branch,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, dated Feb. 12, 1992, on file with author).
135 (average number of trial days per judge per year) I 11.4 (average number of trial days
per antitrust case) = 11.8. Average recurring cost of a federal district court judgeship is
$605,000 I 11.8 = $51,000 per case.
148 In 1979, 1,234 civil antitrust cases were filed. See supra note 142. In 1991, 681
civil antitrust cases were filed. 1991 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 141, at 56. This decrease
probably is not relevant, however, because this section is ultimately concerned with average
judicial resources per antitrust case, not total judicial resources spent on antitrust.
149 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
150 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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judicial calendars. 151 Antitrust settlements, moreover, often involve little court
time.
Nevertheless, huge antitrust cases continue to be litigated, 152 and some
areas of antitrust have become more complex. 153 For all these reasons, it seems
reasonable to construct a range for the judicial costs of handling antitrust cases
that is both relatively large and lower than the sixteen percent figure presented
above. This Article will assume a range of five to twenty percent of the transfer
effects of market power, a range of course subject to the same uncertainty
present throughout this analysis.

F. Umbrella Effects ofMarket Power
Courts are split over whether customers of the violator's competitors can
successfully sue the offenders on the theory that the offenders were responsible
for "umbrella" effects. 154 As a practical matter, however, umbrella effect
damages are rarely awarded against an offending cartel or monopoly, 155 largely
because of proof problems.156
It is difficult to estimate how large an adjustment should be made for these
uncompensated consequences of market power.157 There are severe problems

151 See, e.g., 1991.ANNuALREPoRT, supra note 141, at2-10.
152 Of the 56 civil cases in district courts requiring more than 25 trial days during the
12-month period ending June 30, 1990, 8 were antitrust cases. 1990 ANNuAL REPoRT,

supra note 142, at 165-66 (fable C-9).

153

For example, vertical nonprice cases today probably use more judicial resources
on the average than they did 20 years ago.
154 Compare Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573
(3rd Cir. 1979) (no standing granted to customers of competitors of violators to sue violator
for these damages) with Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) (standing allowed for umbrella claims); see also discussion in
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANrrrRUST LAw , 337.3 (Supp. 1992)
(making a persuasive argument that such plaintiffs should have standing).
155 See sources cited in AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 154 (citations to, and
analysis of, many of the relatively few cases that discuss the issue); see also State of Wash.
v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Cal. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 842 (1968) (umbrella claims allowed; proof problems discussed).
156 Practical proof problems include causation complexities, confidentiality issues, and
coordination difficulties. See Page, supra note 23, at 1490-92.
157 Umbrella effects are less likely when a cartel or monopoly has a smaller market
share. !.andes and Posner conclude that market power is unlikely to occur when a firm has
less than a 40% market share. See !.andes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REv. 937, 944 n.IS (1981) (citing F.M. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
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in using carteP5S or merger159 cases to arrive at even rough estimates of
possible umbrella effects. Monopolization cases, however, are relatively
suitable; monopoly power is required, market shares are often reported, and
markets are defined with relative care. This subpart contains the analysis of
three groups of monopolization cases (one collected by Koller that encompasses
cases from 1907 to 1965,160 one collected by Zerbe and Cooper that
encompasses cases from 1944 to 1981,161 and one consisting of every plaintiff
victory at the court of appeals level from 1980 through 1991) that, together,
should constitute a good sample.162 Attempted monopolization cases were
excluded because umbrella effects are far less likely in these situations.
The firms judged by the courts to be monopolists in Koller's sample163
were found to have had an average market share of approximately eighty-two
STRUCTURE AND

EcoNOMIC PERFoRMANCE 232 (2d ed. 1980)). Professor Weiss's massive
study of the relationship between concentration and price concludes that there rarely is any
relationship if the four leading firms in a market have less than a combined 50% share, but
that industry concentrations above this critical level frequently lead to supracompetitive
pricing for an industry. Leonard W. Weiss, A Review of Concentration-Price Studies in
Banking, in CONCENfRATION AND PRICE 272-74, 283 (Leonard W. Weiss ed., 1989)
(volume includes other pertinent studies by Marvel, Berger, and Hannan). These data
suggest that the largest fringe in which umbrella effects could occur normally would consist
of50% ofamarket.
15S It is exceedingly difficult to determine the average market share of cartels because
courts do not routinely report cartels' market shares or devote a great deal of effort to
accurately defining the relevant market for these per se offenses. Nor does every illegal
cartel possess market power. See generally A.B.A • .ANrrrnUST SECTION, supra note 94, at
33-41.
159 Merger cases usually report market shares and give careful attention to market
definition, although the prophylactic nature of the antimerger statutes makes it uncertain that
illegal mergers would often give rise to significant umbrella effects. See Fisher & Lande,
supra note 19, at 1591.
160 See ROLAND H. KOLLER, PREDATORY PRICING IN A MARKET EcoNOMY (1969).
161 See Richard 0. Zerbe & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical
Comparison ofAlternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655 (1982).
162 I am grateful to William Atkins for assistance with this analysis.
163 Many of the cases in Koller's sample were attempted monopolization cases or
cases that did not give usable market share statistics. KOLLER, supra note 160, at 45-47.
There were many "close calls" that arguably could have been included, such as Forster
Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 335 F.2d 47, 49-52 Q.st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965)
("effect of ••• [company's price] discriminations ••• has resulted in a tendeJ!CY toward
monopoly ••• " with 58% of the market); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New
England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 Q.st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961)
(newspaper enjoyed what might be termed a "'natural' monopoly" by employing practices
that eventually gave it a 100% market share; average share over time not reported).
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percent by the courts and eighty percent by Koller.l64 The Zerbe and Cooper
sample (excluding cases also reported by Koller) yields an average market
share of seventy-nine percent, 165 while the more recent sample (excluding cases

164 KOLLER, supra note 160. These unweighted averages were derived from the
following plaintiff victories holding that the firm with the stated market share possessed
monopoly power: (1) United States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. 781, 795-97 Q.946)
(averaging cigarette market shares of90.7%, 73.3%, 71%, and 68%, or an average share
of 75.8%, with a "10 cent cigarette" market share of 80%, for an average of 77.9%;
averaging this 77.9% figure, in tum, with 75.3% (from shares of 83.6%, 84.7%, 85.8%,
76.4%, 79.7%, 74.9%, 72.8%, 71.6%, 68.8%, 66.4%, and 63.2% in KOLLER, supra note
160, at 142}, for a combined two sample average of76.6%); (2) United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 157, 159, 176 (1911) (cartel with "96 or 97"% market share in
1890, 88.9% in 1891, for an average share of 92.7%; figures for 6 different markets in
KoLLER, supra note 160, at 75, averaging 85.8%; combined average (of 92.7% and
85.8%) of 89.3%); (3) United States v. Standard Oil Co. of NJ., 221 U.S. I (19ll)
(averaging 90% (See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 33) with 75.8% (an average based on shares
of 80% (transportation), 75% (refining), 50% (tank cars), 80% (illuminating oil), 80%
(naphta), and 90% Qubricating oil) reported in the decision below at 173 F. 177, 178, 192
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909)) for an average of 82.9%; Koller reports shares of 90% (refining)
and 80% (pipelines), or an average of 85% (KOLLER, supra note 160, at 55-56; combined
average of 82.9% and 85% is 84%); (4) United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
188 F. 127, 145, 154 (C.C.D. Del. 1911) (defendant with shares of 64%, 72%, 72%, 73%,
64%, and 100%, for an average of74.2%; same estimates in KOLLER, supra note 160, at
98).
165 Zerbe & Cooper, supra note 161. There were 40 cases in the Zerbe & Cooper
article, of which 18 were also analyzed in the Koller study, supra note 160, and therefore
are not analyzed in this footnote. Only the following cases had specific language holding
that the firm possessed monopoly power and reported usable market share statistics:
Borden, Inc. v. F.T.C., 674 F.2d 498, 5ll (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded because
ofsettlement, 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (Borden possessed 75.3% to 88% on a volume basis and
88.9% to 91.8% on a dollar basis. These average to 86%, and the court held that "these
market shares are more than sufficient to infer monopoly power •••• " Borden, 674 F.2d at
511.); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 23,
31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978) ("an entity controlling more than 80% of the
market, would be sufficient to allow the jury to find" monopoly power; the court used
80%); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488,
496-97 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 Q.978) ("[t]here was evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer that IBM possessed monopoly power" with market
shares of 82.5% in 1964, 75.1% in 1967, and 64.68% in 1970, for an average of 74.1%);
Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1054-55 (D.NJ. 1977) (average of four year market
share (T/.4% in 1971, 78.6% in 1972, 77.5% in 1973 and 1974) is 77.75%. This market
share level created a "presumption of monopoly power" found to be attributable to skill,
efficiency and foresight.). ·
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also reported by Zerbe and Cooper) produces an average market share of
seventy-six percent.l66 These results imply an "average" monopolist market

166 The USAPP file of the Lexis GENFED library was searched in August 1992 with
the term "Antitrust and Sherman Act and Monopoly and Section Two or Section 2 and Date
{Aft 1979)." This search produced 461 cases that were decided in the years 1980 to 1991 by
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The following plaintiff victories reported usable market share
statistics and contained specific language supporting a conclusion that the firm possessed
monopoly power: Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951, 969 (lOth
Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) ("we hold that sufficient evidence supports the
jury's findings of market and monopoly power" with market control of 47% to 62%; this
averages to 54.5%); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283-85
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990) {although not a§ 2 case, postmerger share of
64% to 72% "would create a firm having a market share approaching, perhaps exceeding,
a common threshold of monopoly power-two thirds •••• "); Omni Outdoor Advertising
Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 891 F.2d 1127, 1142 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991) ("a case of retention and solidification of monopoly
power" with market control of 95%); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Wmdmere Corp., 861 F.2d
695, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989) ("[e]vidence that a firm
holding 90% of a market that has substantial entry barriers drastically slashes its prices in
response to the competition of a new entrant ••• is sufficient to show
monopolization •••• "); Oahu Gas Serv. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366-67
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988) {affirmed a jury finding that the defendant
possessed monopoly power with 100%, 95.5%, 89.7%, ~9.6%, 68.2% market shares in
different years, which averages to 84.6%); Syufy Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc.,
793 F.2d 990, 996 {9th Cir.1986) ("market share of60% to 69%, when coupled with other
evidence of additional factors, is adequate" to support a jury finding of monopoly power;
average is 64.5%); Bonjomo v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern., 752 F.2d 802, 809, 811 {3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986) ("sufficient evidence to permit the
monopolization claim to go to the jury" with 80% of the market); United States v.
American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d lll4, lll5-16, lll8 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 474
U.S. 1001 (1985) ("would have acquired monopoly power" with 76% overall market
share); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520, 1525 (lOth
Cir. 1984), qff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (market share every year but one between 81.5% and
83.2% supported finding of monopoly power); Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp
Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1299 {9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983) (over 90% market
share shows sufficient monopoly power for§ 2 violation); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v.
Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1357 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030
(1981) (SO% to 64% enough for monopolization in light of the small number of
competitors, high entry barriers, limited products, and the defendant's power over price);
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981) (65% market share was sufficient basis for a finding of market
power to support monopolization claim).
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share of between seventy-five and eighty-five percent, and thus an average
share of the nonmonopolistic fringe of fifteen to twenty-five percent167
This does not, of course, necessarily mean that the umbrella effects of
monopoly power can safely be assumed to apply to a fifteen to twenty-five
percent market share. Actual umbrella effects can be larger or smaller for many
reasons. Some antitrust violators can, like OPEC, cause umbrella effects in
related markets for substitute or complementary products; activities that raise
rivals' costs also can give rise to a type of umbrella effect. 168 Umbrella effects
can also be magnified if they are marked up and passed to another level in a
distribution chain.1 69 Alternatively, some fringe firms might choose to maintain
a sub-monopoly price to gain market share. Many types of behavior are
possible, and it is may be nearly impossible to determine what generally occurs
in either monopolization or collusion cases. To account for this uncertainty, the
range over which umbrella effects are likely to occur will be expanded to ten to
thirty percent of a defendant's market. This range means that a relatively low
adjustment for unreimbursed umbrella effects of monopoly power would
increase the effects of market power by eleven percent, 170 while a relatively
high adjustment would increase the effects by forty-three percent.111 As with
other figures in this Article, the umbrella effects estimates must be regarded as
approximations made with incomplete data over which reasonable people can
differ.

167 The sample sizes are small, and there is no guarantee that this range also would
apply to collusion cases. Umbrella effects of cartels might be higher or lower for many
reasons. Successful bid rigging conspiracies, for example, must include all potentially
successful bidders or the conspirators would have to limit price to the level of the excluded
firms.

168 Violators that monopolize by raising rivals' costs are likely to cause strong
umbrella effects because the higher prices charged by rivals are the lever that allows the
violator to increase its prices. See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 19. For an analysis of the
raising rivals' costs phenomena in a damages context, see Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at
12-21.
169 See generally irrfra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
170 Calculated from a 10/90 ratio between the market share of the fringe and the
monopolist.
171 Calculated from a 30no ratio between the market share of the fringe and the
monopolist.
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G. Allocative Inefficiency
Market power almost always results in allocative inefficiency (as well as a
transfer of wealth from the victim(s) to the firm(s) with market power).172 The
only violations that would not give rise to allocative inefficiency would be in
those rare situations in which demand for a product is completely inelastic. 173
Despite allocative inefficiency's virtual ubiquity, there does not appear to
have been even a single instance in which a plaintiff has recovered for any
allocative inefficiency effects of market power.174 Instead, the awarded "treble
damages" treble only the transfer effects of market power.175
It is extremely difficult to determine how large, on average, the allocative
inefficiency effects of market power are likely to be. Thoughtful antitrust
analysts discussing the average ratio of the wealth transfer effects of market
power to its allocative inefficiency effects typically assume a two-to-one
ratio, 176 which follows from the use of a number of standard assumptions.177
Some thoughtful antitrust analysts predict an average ratio lower than two to
one,178 while others predict that the ratio will usually be four to one or higher,
at least under specified conditions.179 All of these assessments are partly

172 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
173 An example of a product that could rise significantly in price without suffering a
measurable decrease in quantity demanded might be insulin.
174 The practical proof problems involved would make this a formidable task. See
Page, supra note 23, at 1489-90.
115 /d. See generally Charles C. Van Cott, Note, Standing at the Fringe: AnJilrust
Damages and the Fringe Producer, 35 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1983).
176 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Panel Discussion, 55 .ANrn'RUST LJ. 123, 126
(1986); Frank H. Easterbook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L.
REv. 263, 330 n.144 (1981); Richard Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95
HAR.v. L. REv. 1789, 1812 (1982).
177 See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, EcoNOMICS AND FEDERAL .ANrn'RUST LAW 401
(1985). As Judge Easterbrook observed, the two to one ratio depends upon the assumption
of linear demand and supply curves, and "[t}hese curves doubtless are not linear, but legal
rules must be derived from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation."
Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 455.
178 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 .ANrn'RUST BULL. 233, 249
(1988) (citing for support JOAN ROBINSON, THE EcoNOMICS OF IMPERFECr CoMPETITION 144
(2d ed. 1969)). Concave demand curves imply a lower ratio, and Hovenkamp believes that
demand curves are more likely to be concave than convex.
179 See Fisher & Lande, supra note 19, at 1645. FISher and Lande show how a ratio
ranging from 4/1 to 40/1 might arise from an anticompetitive merger under specified
circumstances. The analysis assumes, inter alia, a price rise that would not exceed 30%;
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theoretical because the actual ratio depends upon such factors as the actual
average amounts of price increases caused by market power and the average
demand elasticity in specific situations.180 The crucial questions involve the
typical nature of specific underlying real-world parameters, and no one knows
what these actually are. The only empirical estimate of the relative sizes of the
allocative inefficiency and transfer effects appears to be that by Professors
F .M. Scherer and David Ross. They reviewed the empirical literature on the
size of the two effects and concluded that the best evidence suggests the wealth
transfer effects of market power might approximate two to three percent of our
nation's GNP, while the allocative inefficiency effects might range from onehalf to two percent of GNP .181 The averages of these figures yield a ratio of
transfer to allocative inefficiency of211; the highs a ratio of 1.511; and the lows
a ratio of 411.1 82
If a ratio of 2/1 is assumed, market power resulting in one dollar in
transfer effects would also result in another fifty cents in allocative
inefficiency.183 A more conservative approach would use a ratio of 411; that is,
each dollar in transfer is accompanied by only twenty-five cents in allocative
inefficiency. This Article will use these ranges in subsequent calculations: it
will assume that every dollar in transferred wealth produces an additional
twenty-five to fifty cents in allocative inefficiency.184
because mergers likely to give rise to larger increases probably would be prevented, they
are unlikely ever to be attempted. A cartel or monopoly would be more likely to lead to a
larger increase, however, and larger increases usually result in dramatically lower ratios of
transfer to allocative inefficiency. !d. at 1644-50. Thus, the ratios calculated in the FISher &
Lande article would be less likely to generalize to market power created by antitrust
violations other than mergers. For additional qualifications and insights, see Laura B.
Peterson, Comment on Antitrust Remedies, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 483, 486 (1985).
180 FISher & Lande, supra note 19.
181 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCI'URE AND EcoNOMIC
PERFoRMANCE 661-67 (3d ed. 1990).
182 Calculated as follows:
(2+3/(.5+2.0) = 2.5/1.25 = 2.0 (using averages)
3/2 = 1.5 (using highs)
21.5 = 4.0 (using lows)
183 Judge Easterbrook points out that this factor alone reduces damages so that "[t]rom
the violators perspective, 'treble' damages really are double the starting point of overcharge
plus allocative loss •••• "Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 455.
184 This assumes that allocative inefficiency also results from the fringe's price
increases. The monopoly or cartel would have to take the fringe's reaction, whether
cooperative or competitive, into account in fixing the final supracompetitive price.
Afterwards, allocative inefficiency should result from the entire industry's subcompetitive
output.
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H. Tax Effects185
1. Defendants' Perspective

Tax considerations normally would not affect the corporate defendant's
relative gains and losses. The gain, payout, 186 attorneys' fees, and time spent
pursuing the case would normally affect corporate income or constitute a
deductible business expense. These effects would normally cancel one another
so that there would be no relative tax effect upon defendants.

2. Business Plaintiffs' Perspective
With one important exception, normally the effects of taxes on the actual
magnitude of the gains and losses from antitrust violations should cancel one
another for business plaintiffs. A business victim would have less profit, for
example, as a result of being forced to pay overcharges resulting from price
fixing.187 With one crucial exception, the recovery would be taxed as ordinary
income, 188 so the victim normally189 would be in the same relative position

185 The author is grateful to his colleagues Fred Brown, Walter Schwidetzky and
Wendy Shaller for assistance on this subpart.
186 See Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57. The defendant's payment is only one-third
deductible, however, if the civil suit is a follow-on to a criminal conviction or nolo
contendere plea. See I.R.C. § 162 f'Nest Supp. 1992); see Federal Paper Bd. Co. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1011 (1988). Kauper and Snyder, however, reported that only 9%
of all cases filed in the Georgetown sample were follow-on cases. Kauper & Snyder, supra
note 98, at 329, 333. In recent years, moreover, this figure was only 6%. !d. at 332.
However, the follow-on cases were dismissed less frequently, and 16% of the cases in the
Georgetown sample that were litigated to a conclusion were follow-on cases. Calculated
from id. at 344.
This Article is only focusing on civil cases. An entirely different set of considerations
apply to criminal antitrust actions.
187 If we assume an average marginal federal corporate income tax rate of
approximately 34% (I.R.C. § ll f'Nest Supp. 1992) (provides that, at least after the phaseout of the benefits attributable to low initial corporate tax rates, corporations with taxable
income exceeding $75,000 pay a marginal tax rate of34%) and an assumed average state
corporate tax rate of approximately 6%, then the victim's lost profit would be reduced by
40%.

188 I.R.C. § 61 f'Nest Supp. 1992); see also i'!fra note191.
189 If the recovery is for destroyed goodwill, however, the analysis is more complex.
Such a recovery would be nontaxable to the extent it does not exceed the corporation's basis
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both before and after taxes. Attorneys' fees would be deductible business
expenses190 and lost corporate employees' time or expenses would diminish
overall corporate income.
The important exception comes from section 186 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which has a major effect on the relative status of business plaintiffs. This
section provides that compensatory antitrust damages included in gross
income191 (reduced by amounts paid in securing the award) shall in turn be
allowed as a deduction.192 This provision conveys a significant advantage upon
business plaintiffs who recover lost income in antitrust cases.
To illustrate (putting aside for simplicity the issue of legal fees), suppose a
plaintiff pays one dollar extra for its products because of price fixing and
receives three dollars after the judgment. Assume that the effective corporate
income tax rate is forty percent193 The prejudgment loss to the plaintiff would
only be sixty cents.194 The taxable postjudgment gain would be two dollars
(three dollars less one dollar). Thus, the plaintiff would be left in the year of
judgment, after taxes, with $2.20.195
An example incorporating the effects of legal fees would be slightly more
complex. Assume that a plaintiff initially pays an additional one dollar because
of a cartel and also incurs thirty-five to eighty cents in legal fees. Suppose that
plaintiff later recovers three dollars plus thirty to sixty cents in legal fees.196
Assume that the effective corporate tax rate is forty percent.197 As a result of
tax savings, the prejudgment loss to the plaintiff would only be between $.81

in the goodwill. Ad VISOr, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 141 (1978); State Ftsh
Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 465 (1967). The recovery would be treated as a capital
gain to the extent it exceeded the corporation's basis. Rev. Proc. 67-33, 1967-2C.B. 659.
190 I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1Q92).
191 Typically the full $3.00 would be included in income subject to the I.R.C. § 186
deduction. Portions of some awards, however, will not be included in gross income to the
extent they compensate the victim for destroyed goodwill. The plaintiff's basis in its
goodwill is decreased to the extent of the nontaxable compensatory recovery when the
recovery is less than the basis. Awards in excess of basis generate gain. I.R.C. § 1001 (West
Supp. 1992).
192 I.R.C. § 186 (a) (West Supp. 1992).
193 See supra note 187.
194 Calculated as follows: $1.00 x .60 = .60. This calculation assumes that the $1.00
diminished plaintiff's income.
195 Calculated as follows: ($2.00 x .60) + $1.00 = $2.20.
196 This hypothetical assumes that the plaintiff will obtain less in legal fees than it paid
because of the reasons given supra in subpart ill.C. It also assumes, for simplicity, that the
legal fees were incurred in an earlier year than the year of judgment.
197 See supra note 187 for the underlying rationale.
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and $1.08, rather than $1.35 and $1.80. 198 The postjudgment taxable gain
would range from $2.30 to $2.60.199 Because this amount would be taxable at
the forty percent rate, and because the one dollar deduction would not be
taxable at all, the plaintiff would be left with $2.38 to $2.56.200

3. Conswner Plaintiffs' Perspective
The effects of taxation on consumer plaintiffs are also significant because
consumers buy supracompetitively priced goods with after-tax dollars. While
they would not be required to pay income tax on the portion of their recovery
that compensated them for the extra amount they paid when the violation
occurred201 or for the attorneys' fees that the court awarded,202 the "punitive
double damages" portion of the award would be taxable as ordinary income.203
The average marginal tax rate for consumers is approximately thirty
percent, roughly twenty-five percent for federal tax204 plus another five percent

198 ($1.00 + (.35 to .80) X .60) = $.81 to $1.08.
199 Calculated as follows: $3.00 + (.30 + .60) - $1.00

= $2.30 to $2.60. The $1.00
is excluded from income under § 186. Because the .30 to .60 attorneys' fees were deducted
in the year they were paid to the attorneys they cannot be deducted again.
200 Calculated as follows ($2.30 to $2.60) x .60 + 1.00 = $2.38 to $2.56.
201 Any increase in wealth is taxable if it is received in lieu of taxable income.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Hort v. Commissioner, 313
U.S. 28 (1941); Raytheon Prod. Corp v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 {1939), acq., 1957-1
C.B. 4 holds that damages paid to compensate for nondeductible economic losses are not
includible in income.
202, Technically, it is possible that only two-thirds of the attorneys' fees could be
considered as an expenditure to produce income, I.R.C. § 212(1) (West Supp. 1992),
because one-third could be attributable to recovery of the overcharge, and therefore only
two-thirds of the attorneys' fees might be deductible as an expense for the production of
income. It seems unlikely as a practical matter, however, that consumers would have to pay
tax on the remainder, because as a matter of administrative convenience, the I.R.S. would
be unlikely to attempt to collect the tax on this one-third of the imputed attorneys' fees, an
amount that is likely to be trivial for virtually every consumer. Another complication could
arise from the fact that deductions for production of income, such as attorneys' fees, are
only deductible to the extent they exceed 2% of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 67 (\Vest
Supp. 1992).
203 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431-33.
204 The current federal marginal tax rates for individuals are 15%, 28% and 31%. The
28% marginal tax bracket starts at a high of $32,450 (for married individuals filing joint
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for state tax.2os This means that a one dollar overcharge actually would cost
consumers one dollar, but they probably will pay thirty percent income tax on
two dollars of their recovery. Thus, the total recovery they would actually
receive would be reduced to $2.40.206
Another issue involves interest consumers might have lost because of the
violation.207 Absent the violation, consumers might have earned some $.60 to
$1.18 in interest on every dollar in overcharges during the period between the
occurrence of overcharges and judgment.208 Because consumers would have
had to pay tax on this interest had it been earned, it seems reasonable to
consider their loss as reduced by approximately thirty percent because of the
tax they would have had to pay on this interest.209 Thus, a tentative loss
ranging from $.68 to $1.18 because of the lack of prejudgment interest would
be reduced by thirty percent, down to only a loss of forty-eight to eighty-three
cents. Consumers of fringe firms able to price higher because of the violator(s)
actions would be similarly affected, so the reduction actually would be greater,

returns) and a low of $16,225 (for married individuals filing separate returns). I.R.C. § 1
(West Supp. 1992). Taxable income falls into these brackets as follows:
A
Income Tax Rate

B
Total Taxable Income

c

15%
28%
31%

$729,421,936
$942,204,831
$592,034,469

32%
42%
26%

AxC

% ofTotal

5%
12%
8%
25%

Thus, the weighted average personal income tax rate is 25% at the margin. These
figures are for the 1990 tax year. See IRS, 12 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 154 (1992).
205 The average state income tax rate, for low to high tax brackets, was between
2.07% and 5.11 %. Many states also have local "piggyback" provisions. For example,
Maryland permits counties to charge up to 50% of the state's maximum rate of 5%. See
Tim WORLD ALMANAC AND BooK OF FACTS 188-89 (MarkS. Hoffinan et al. eds., 1992).
206 Calculated as follows: 30% x 2.00 = 60C tax; $3.00 - .60 = $2.40. Section 212
would not apply.
207 "Consumer surplus" is essentially an after-tax concept, so no tax effect will be
calculated on the allocative inefficiency effects of market price.
208 This calculation assumes the 7.69% to 10.22% rates of return computed in subpart

m.A.

209 Alternately, if they had been able to deposit the overcharge in an interest bearing
account, they would have been required to pay tax on the interest. The amount the
consumers actually receive therefore should be calculated after tax.
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perhaps by a factor of 1.25.210 The total tax savings to consumers would range
from twenty-five cents to forty-four cents.211
In sum, there are no significant net tax effects for defendants. If consumers
are plaintiffs, however, all interest they would have earned on the money they
were wrongfully deprived of, and two-thirds of their recovery, would have
been taxed at approximately thirty percent.212 If plaintiffs are corporations, the
section 186 deduction for compensatory damages would significantly improve
their status as noted above. This Article, therefore, will use these different
adjustments to account for tax effects in subsequent calculations depending
upon whether corporate plaintiffs, consumer plaintiffs, or defendants are
involved.

IV. COMBINING THE ADJUSTMENTS
Each of the preceding adjustments is, as has been noted, subject to a host
of uncertainties. While it would be possible to arrive at and combine a "best
estimate" for each factor, this approach could inadvertently convey the
impression that any number so generated was very likely to be accurate.
Accordingly, this Article has constructed a range of estimates for each factor to
raise the probability that the true adjustments will be encompassed within this
Article's analysis. A "low adjustment" uses the extreme of each range that
would least tend to change the nominal "trebling" multiplier, while a "high
adjustment" uses the extreme that produces the greatest change. The high and
low estimates are then averaged to produce a mean estimate.21 3

210 See subpart m.F for a range of possibilities.
211 (.20 to .35) X 1.25 = .25 to .44.
212 This assumption may slightly overstate consumers' actual recovery. See supra note
202.

213 A potential problem with the approach used in this Article is that when all the low
adjustments (i.e., estimates that would not change the nominal "trebling" factor very much)
are combined to produce a low estimate, and all the high adjustments (i.e., estimates that
tend to reduce the nominal "trebling" factor a great deal) are combined, the result might be
an unrealistically wide range. It seems unlikely that all of either the high or the low
estimates are correct. Hopefully, the errors offset one another to a significant degree. A
figure close to the mean of all the adjustments might be justified not only because it
represents the mean estimate for the adjustments, but also because of this offsetting
tendency.
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A. Under an Optimal Deterrence Framework
Subpart II(B) shows, under an optimal deterrence perspective, that an
antitrust violation's "damages" should consist of its net harm to others.
Damages calculated under this approach should include an adjustment for the
direct transfer and inefficiency effects of market power, lack of prejudgment
interest, effects of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and other
costs of bringing suit, and court costs.214 It should include the inefficiency
results of umbrella effects of market power,21s but not the wealth transfer
effects.216 Nor should it consider income tax effects.217
Table 1 contains the results of combining the appropriate adjustments.
Stage I presumes an initial overcharge of one dollar and incorporates the effects
of a range of adjustments that should be made even if no litigation were filed.
These changes compensate for the effects of the lack of prejudgment interest,218
directly-caused allocative inefficiency,219 and the allocative inefficiency aspects
of the umbrella effects of monopoly power.22o Stage II incorporates the effects
of antitrust litigation, adjusting for attorneys' fees,221 other plaintiff costs of
pursuing the case,222 and court costs.223 Stage m incorporates the effects of an
award of three dollars (the one dollar overcharge trebled) plus "reasonable"
attorneys' fees,224 less the damages not awarded because of the statute of
limitations.225
Table I shows that the effects of the low adjustments indicate that awarded
damages are approximately equal to actual damages (they are 1.09 times as
large), while the high estimate for the adjustments yields awarded damages of
forty-eight percent, or approximately half of actual damages. The mean of the
high and low damages and awards calculations produces an estimate-sixtyeight percent-that is less than actual damages

214 See supra subparts ill.A-E.
215 See supra subpart m.F.
216 See supra subpart ill.G.
217 See supra subpart m.H.
218 See supra subpart ill.A.
219 See supra subpart ill.G.
220 See supra subparts ill.F and ill.G.
221 See supra subpart m.c. Of course, attorneys' fees will be awarded to a victorious
plaintiff, and these will be accounted for appropriately.
222 See supra subpart ill.D.
223 See supra subpart m.E.
224 See supra subpart m.c.
225 See supra subpart ill.B.
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Estimates of the Actual Magnitude of the "Treble" Damages Remedy

Table 1: Deterrence Perspective
Range of
Adjustments

Effects of Low
Adjustments

Effects of High
Adjustments

I. Initial overchage of $1.00
A. No prejudgment
interest

7.69% for 7 yrs. =
1.68; to 10.22% for 8
yrs. = 2.18

-1.00 X 1.68 = -1.68

-1.00x2.18 =-2.18

B. Allocative
inefficiency

25% to 50% of the
transfer

-1.68 X 1.25 = -2.10

-2.18 X 1.50 = -3.27

C. Umbrella effects'
allocative
inefficiency

effects on 10% to
30% of market times
(25% to 50%)

-2.10 X 1.03 = -2.16

-3.27 X 1.22 = -3.99

D. Attorneys' fees

35% to 80% ofthe
transfer

-2.16- .35 = -2.51

-3.99- .80 = -4.79

E. Other costs of
pursuing case

20% to 65% ofthe
transfer

-2.51- .20 = -2.71

-4.79-.65 = -5.44

F. Court costs

5% to 20% of the

-2.71-0.05 = -2.76

-5.44- .20 = -5.64

n. Litigation effects

transfer

m. Effects of tentative award of$3.00 plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees
G. Tentative award

$3.00 plus (.30 to .60)

3.30

3.60

H. After effects of the
statute of
limitations

unrecoverable 10% to
30% of$3.00

3.30- .30 = 3.00

3.60-.90 = 2.70

3.00-2.76 = .26

2.70- 5.64 = -2.94

I. Net effects of award

Actual Magnitude of the "Treble" Damages Remedy:
Low Adjustments

Awarded damages are approximately actual damages;
3.00/2.76 = 1.09 times actual damages.

High Adjustments

Awarded damages are significantly less than actual damages;
2.70/5.64 = 48% times actual damages.

Mean Adjustment

Mean value of the ratio of awarded damages to actual
damages; (3.00 + 2.70)/2 = 2.85; (2.76 + 5.64)/2 =
4.20; 2.85/4.20 = 68% of actual damages.
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B. Under a Compensation Framework
If compensating those harmed by violations is a purpose of antitrust
damages provisions, it is necessary to calculate all reasonably foreseeable
damages to others caused by a violation.226 The appropriate adjustments will be
performed for three different groups of victims. The first will consider all
victims-all purchasers, whether consumers or businesses, and society as a
whole; the second will focus only upon consumer victims; and the last will
focus upon businesses victimized by antitrust violations.

1. Compensating All Victims-Purchasers, Taxpayers and Society
The broadest compensation approach would compensate all reasonably
foreseeable victims of antitrust violations. It would account for such damages to
purchasers as overcharges, lack of prejudgment interest,227 effects of the statute
of limitations,228 and plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 229 It also would consider
damages caused to society from allocative inefficiency and the costs to the
judicial system. It would adjust for the umbrella effects of market power's
allocative inefficiency results and (unlike the deterrence perspective) also its
transfer results.230
A total compensation approach need not, however, consider tax effects, for
it is concerned only with the total potentially compensable damage caused by
antitrust violations. Tax effects merely shift some of the loss or recovery
between direct victims and the taxpayers; they do not affect total damages
caused by the violation. (The next two subparts, however, will reconsider the
analysis from the perspective of consumer-plaintiffs and business-plaintiffs.
Each will consider tax effects.).
One additional complexity must be incorporated. Subpart ID(D) calculated
the value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case to be between twenty and
sixty-five percent of the transfer effects of market power. A consumer class
action, however, probably would involve negligible amounts of consumer time.
Because some plaintiffs are consumers, the low estimate used in this subpart to
account for the value of lost plaintiff time will be lowered to zero.
226 See supra subpart ll.A.
227 See supra subpart ill.A.
228 See supra subpart ill.B.
229 See supra subpart m.c. Attorneys' fees awarded as part of the recovery will also
be factored into the analysis.
230 See supra subpart ill.F and ill.G. Many antitrust violations are undetectable or
cannot be proven. Victims of these violations will not, of course, be compensated.
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Table 2: Compensation Perspective: Compensating All Victims
Range
of
Adjustments

Effects of Low
Adjustments on
All Victims

Effects of High
Adjustments on
All Victims

A. No prejudgment
interest

7.69% for7yrs. =
1.68; to 10.22% for 8
yrs. = 2.18

-1.00 x 1.68 = -1.68

-1.00 x2.18 = -2.18

B. Umbrellaeffects'
allocative
inefficiency

effects on 10% to
30% of market

-1.68 X 1.11

C. Allocative
inefficiency

25% to 50% of the
transfer

-1.86 X 1.25 = -2.32

D. Attorneys' fees

35%to80%

-2.32- .35

E. Other costs of
pursuing case

0 to 65% of the
transfer

no change

-5.48- .65 = -6.13

F. Court costs

5% to 20% of the
transfer

-2.67- .OS= -2.72

-6.13-.20 = -6.33

I. Initial overcharge of$1.00

= -1.86

-2.18 X 1.43

= -3.12

-3.12 X 1.50 = -4.68

n. Litigation effects
= -2.67

-4.68- .80

= -5.48

m. Effects of tentative award of$3.00 plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees
G. Tentative award

$3.00 plus (.30 to .60)

3.30

3.60

H. After effects of the
statute of
limitations

unrecoverable 10% to
30% of$3.00

3.30- .30 = 3.00

3.60-.90 = 2.70

3.00-2.72 = .28

2.70-6.33

I. Net effects of award

= -3.63

Actual Magnitude of the "Treble" Damages Remedy:
Low Adjustments

Awarded damages are approximately actual damages;
3.00/2.72 = 1.10 times actual damages.

High Adjustments

Awarded damages are significantly less than actual damages;
2.70/6.33 = .43 times actual damages.

Mean Adjustments

Mean value of the ratio of awarded damages to actual
damages; (3.00 + 2.70)/2 = 2.85; (2.72 + 6.33)/2 = 4.52;
2.85/4.52 = .63 times actual damages.
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Table 2 combines the appropriate adjustments. Stage I assumes an initial
overcharge of one dollar, and adjusts for three factors: lack of prejudgment
interest,231 umbrella effects of monopoly power,232 and allocative
inefficiency.233 These adjustments would apply even if no litigation occurred.
Stage n builds in the effects of antitrust litigation. It adjusts for attorneys'
fees,234 corporate costs of pursuing the case,235 and court costs.236 Stage m
incorporates the effects of an award of three dollars (the dollar overcharge
trebled) plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees,23 7 and also the effects of the statute
of limitations.238
As Table 2 shows, the effects of the low adjustments demonstrate that
awarded damages are approximately equal to actual damages (they are actually
ten percent larger), while the high estimate shows that awarded damages are
nearly half of actual damages (forty-three percent). The mean of the high and
low damage awards produces an estimate that is less than actual damages
(sixty-three percent).

2. Compensating Conswner Plaintiffs
This section focuses solely upon consumers for two reasons. First, the net
effect on consumers is of interest if the primary purpose of antitrust law is to
protect consumers.239 Second, in close cases judges sometimes decline to
impose liability out of a reluctance to "over-reward" consumer-plaintiffs.240
For both reasons, this Article will attempt to determine the size of consumers'
actual damages compared with their eventual recovery.
Some of the damages calculated in subpart IV(B)(l)-the allocativeinefficiency effects of market power-were losses to society in general, not

231 See supra subpart ill.A.
232 See supra subpart ill.F.
233 See supra subpart ill.G.
234 See supra subpart m.c. Of course, attorneys' fees will be awarded to a victorious
plaintiff, and these will be accounted for appropriately.
235 See supra subpart ill.D.
236 See supra subpart m.E.
237 See supra subpart m.c.
238 See supra subpart ill.B.
239 See Lande, supra note 16.
240 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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specifically to consumers of the products in question.241 Moreover, some of the
damages to consumers, and some of the recovery, might be shifted to taxpayers
through the tax laws, but this effect was ignored because subpart IV(B)(l) was
concerned only with calculating total damages to all victims of the violation.
Table 3 assumes an initial overcharge of one dollar, and in Stage I adjusts
for the transfers from consumers to violators caused by umbrella effects of
market power,242 lack of prejudgment interest,243 and taxes saved by the
consumers on the interest they would have earned absent the violation.244 Stage
TI, litigation effects, does not adjust for attorneys' fees because the analysis
assumes that plaintiffs' attorneys will fund the lawsuit themselves in the hope
that the court will award them reasonable attorneys' fees. 245 Nor does the
analysis adjust for consumer time spent pursuing the case, for this time is likely
to be negligible. Stage m considers the effect of a tentative award of
threedollars to the consumers plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees to the attorneys,
adjusting for effects of the statute of limitations and taxes.246
The net effect of the low adjustments is that consumers receive
compensation approximating 132 percent of their losses. The high adjustments
imply that consumers are only compensated for sixty-four percent of their
losses. The mean of these figures shows that successful plaintiffs receive ninety
percent of their losses; that is, approximately single damages.

24I The term "consumers" is used in this subpart to include only those individuals who
actually purchased the product(s) or service(s) at issue, not those who would have purchased
at the competitive level but declined to do so at the supracompetitive level.
242 See supra note subpart ill.F. This section will include an adjustment for umbrella
effects' transfer effects, but not their allocative inefficiency effects. One could eliminate the
adjustment for the transfers caused by the umbrella effects because they victimize
consumers not involved in the lawsuit, but this Article will include these effects because
they do victimize consumers.
243 See supra subpart ill.A.
244 See supra subpart ill.H.
245 This assumption could overstate the amount that consumers actually recover
because of the reasons given supra in subpart
246 Interest that consumers would have earned absent the violation would have been
taxed. While tax will be computed for consumers' recovery, this Article will assume that a
winning consumer's attorneys' fees will not be taxed. As a matter of administrative
discretion and convenience, it seems unlikely that the I.R.S. will attempt to make consumers
receiving a $10.00 antitrust award pay tax on the attorneys' fees used to secure two-thirds of
this award, especially because these fees are paid directly to the attorneys. See supra
subparts ill.B, ill.C, and ill.H.

m.c.
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Table 3: Compensation Perspective: Compensating Consumer Plaintiffs
Range
of
Adjustments

Effects of Low
Adjustments on
Consumers

A. No prejudgment
interest

7.69% for7yrs. =
1.68; to 10.08% for 8
yrs. = 2.18

-1.00 X 1.68 = -1.68

-1.00 x2.18 -2.18

B. Tax savings on

.68 to 1.18 interest
would have been taxed
at30%

.68 X .30 = .20;
-1.68 + .20 = -1.48

1.18 X .30 = .35;
-2.18 + .35 = -1.83

Effects on 10% to
30% of lliiiiket

-1.48 X 1.11 = -1.64

-1.83

D. Attorneys' fees

None because assume
paid by plaintiffs'
attorneys

-1.64

-2.62

E. Other costs of
pursuing case

Negligible cost to
customers

-1.64

-2.62

Effects of High
Adjustments on
Consumers

I. Initial OVer'charge Of $1.00

interest

C. Umbrella effects

X

1.43 = -2.62

n. Litigation effects

m. Effects on consumers of tentative award of$3.00 plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees
F. Tentative award

$3.00 (plus attorney
fees to plaintiffs'
attorneys)

3.00

3.00

G. After effects of
statute of
limitations

unrecoverable 10% to
30% of$3.00

3.00-.30 = 2.70

3.00-.90 = 2.10

H. Tax effects on

$2.00- (.20 to .60
unrecoverable) taxable
at30%

2.70- (1.80 X .30) =
2.16

2.10- (1.40 X .30) =
1.68

2.16-1.64 =.52

1.68-2.62 = -.94

award

I. Net effects of award

Actual Magnitude of the "Treble" Damages Remedy:

= 1.32; this is slightly

Low Adjustments

Awarded damages are 2.16/1.64
more than actual damages.

High Adjustments

Awarded damages are 1.68/2.62 = .64; this is slightly less
than actual damages.

Mean Adjustment

Awarded damges are (2.16

+ 1.68)/(1.64 + 2.62) =

this is approximately actual damages.

.90;
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3. Compensating Business Plaintiffs
The preceding analysis can be adapted to business plaintiffs by making two
modifications. First, an adjustment should be made for plaintiffs' costs spent
pursuing the case. Second, an adjustment should be made for different tax
effects.
Table 4 combines adjustments appropriate from the perspective of business
plaintiffs. Stage I presumes a dollar overcharge and adjusts for lack of
prejudgment interest,247 transfers caused by market power's umbrella
effects,248 and tax savings on foregone prejudgment interest.249 Stage ll
considers litigation effects, including attorneys' fees250 and the costs to the
corporation pursuing the case,25 I on an after-tax basis.252 Stage ill incorporates
the effects of a tentative award of three dollars plus "reasonable" attorneys'
fees, 253 the statute of limitations,254 and taxes. 255
The results of Table 4 show that business plaintiffs who sue successfully
probably receive an award that is approximately equal to their actual damages.
The high adjustments (.69), the low adjustments (1.49), and the mean
adjustments (.97) are much closer to single damages than to treble damages.
Table 4 might be misleading, however. It only considers the direct effects
of the damages and subsequent recovery. Business plaintiffs are likely to pass
on most of the overcharges to the products' ultimate consumers.256 Plausible
assumptions suggest that they might pass on the entire overcharge,257 and it is
possible that the direct purchasers will "mark up" the overcharge and pass on
this mark-up as well.258 Thus, business plaintiffs will usually be harmed by

247 See supra subpart ffi.A.
248 See supra subpart m.F.
249 See supra subpart m.H.
250 See supra subpart m.c.
251 See supra subpart ffi.D. '
252 See supra subpart ffi.H.
253 See supra subpart m.c.
254 See supra subpart ffi.B.
255 See supra subpart ffi.H.
25 6 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1719, 1726-27 (1990) (citing HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS§ 17.7 (1987). Business plaintiffs would nevertheless be harmed to the
extent that higher prices decreased the quantity of goods sold.
257 These assumptions include a competitive direct-purchaser market and constant
returns to scale. /d.
25S /d. The necessary assumptions include a competitive direct-purchaser market and
increasing returns to scale. /d.
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Table 4: Compensation Perspective: Compensating Business Plaintiffs
Range
of
Adjustments

Effects of Low
Adjustments on
Business Plaintiffs

Effects of High
Adjustments on
Business Plaintiffs

I.luitial overcharge of$1.00

A. No prejudgment
interest

7.69for7yrs. = 1.68;
to 10.22% for 8 yrs. =
2.18

-1.00 X 1.68 = -1.68

-1.00x2.18 =-2.18

B. Umbrella effects

effects on 10% to 30%
of market

-1.68x 1.11 =-1.86

-2.18 X 1.43 =-3.12

C. Tax savings

1.86 to 3.12 would have
been taxed at 40%

-1.86 X .40 = .74;
-1.86 + .74 = -1.12

-3.12 X .40 = -1.25;
-3.12 + 1.25 = -1.87

D. Attorneys' fees

35% to 80% ofthe
transfer

-1.12-.35 = -1.47

-1.87- .80 = -2.67

E. Other costs of
pursuing case

20% to 65% ofthe

-1.47- .20 = -1.67

-2.67- .65 = -3.32

F. Tax savings on

40% of (.35 + .20) or
(.80 + .65) saved

n. Litigation effects

litigation effects

transfer
-1.67
-1.67

+ (.40 X .55) =
+ .22 = -1.45

-3.32 + (.40 X 1.45) =
-3.32 + .58 = -2.74

m. Effects of tentative award of$3.00 plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees
G. Tentative award

$3.00 plus (.30 to .60)

3.30

3.60

H. After effects of the
statute of
limitations

unrecoverable 10% to
30% of$3.00

3.30- .30 = 3.00

3.60- .90 = 2.70

I. Tax effects on

$2.00 + (.30 to .60)(10% to 30% of$2.00
unrecoverable) taxable at
40%

3.00- (2.10 X .40 in
tax) =2.16

2.70- (2.00 X .40 in tax)
=1.90

award

J. Net effects of award

-1.45

+ 2.16 =

.71

-2.74

+ 1.90 = -.84

Actual Magnitude of the "Treble" Damages Remedy:

Low Adjustments

Awarded damages are approximately 2.1611.45 =
1.49 times actual damages.

High Adjustments

Awarded damages are approximately 1.90/2.74 =
.69 times actual damages.

Mean Adjustments

Awarded damages are approximately
(1.90 + 2.16)/(2.74 + 1.45) = .97 times actual damages.

168

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 54:115

less than the overcharge, and could remain completely unharmed.259 Yet they
probably will not pass any of their subsequent recovery to consumers,260 so the
"treble damages" recovery can be a complete windfall. Unharmed business
plaintiffs might receive infinite damages, not treble or single damages.
The ultimate consumers, by contrast, will receive no recovery. They will
pay most or all of the initial overcharge (or even a greater amount) and receive
none of the fruits of the business plaintiffs' suit. Moreover, as a result of
Rlinois Brick v. Rlinois,26l they have no standing to sue because they are not
direct purchasers. They would not even be helped by raising the nominal
damages multiplier or awarding prejudgment interest; so long as Rlinois Brick
prevails, consumers will be undercompensated.

C. Defendants' Perspective
The optimal deterrence model discussed in subpart ll(B) focused upon the
defendant's perspective. The analysis attempted to determine the set of activity
society wishes to prevent, and then calculated the penalty necessary to
accomplish this task. The optimal penalty standard is different from defendant's
gain (Landes's optimal penalty consists of all net losses to others caused by the
action) for all of the reasons given in subpart ll(B).262
Nevertheless, Professor Calkins and others persuasively demonstrate that
the possibility of "overpunishing" defendants for conduct just below the
standards of legality causes some judges to fail to declare such conduct illegal

259 Business plaintiffs could suffer even if they pass on all of the overcharge because
they might have to make an adjustment to the supracompetitive pricings output reduction
that will give them a one-time loss. /d. Moreover, antitrust actions can affect firms in a
variety of ways, such as making them unduly risk averse, that cannot readily be passed to
consumers.
260 The recovery would be a lump sum expense rather than a change in the firm's
marginal costs, so it should not affect the firm's pricing or output decisions. See id. at 1727.
261 431
720 (1977).
262 This standard should not be surprising because a similar result would arise
concerning much undesirable activity. For example, suppose a thief stole a television that
had just been purchased for $300.00. Society does not hesitate to fine the thief $300.00 (or
more, to account for defendant's risk preference and the low probability of detection and
deterrence) even if the thief could show that be or she had immediately fenced the stolen
television for $50.00. Our concern would in effect be Landes's standard of net harm to
others, the $300.00 loss to the victim, not the $50.00 gain to the thief. If the probability of
detecting the crime and convicting the thief were 113, we would treble $300.00, not $50.00.
(Landes's proposed standard is analogous to requiring people to internalize their
externalities).

u.s.
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and might also affect some judges' decisions on the size of the damages.263 It
therefore becomes important to ascertain two quantities: (1) how much did the
defendant "try to get away with" and (2) how much will defendant actually
have to pay out?
If defendant overcharged by one dollar, defendant would gain more than a
dollar because of the time value of money. 264 The defendant would have to
incur attorneys' fees265 and utilize corporate time266 to defend itself. It would
have to pay plaintiff three dollars plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees, except for
that portion of the damages immunized by the statute of limitations.267 There
would be no net tax considerations.268
Table 5 performs the appropriate adjustments. The low range of
adjustments269 indicate that defendant must pay 201 percent of its attempted
gains,270 the high adjustments27t indicate that defendant must pay 35 percent of
its attempted gains,272 and the mean figures imply that defendant must pay 107
percent of its attempted gains (rather than 300 percent, or "treble" damages).

263 See Calkins, supra note 11. We might hesitate to impose a fine of $900.00 unless
we were virtually certain that the conduct described in the preceding footnote was
undesirable. If the conduct were questionable we might focus upon the gain to defendant
and hesitate to impose a fine of $900.00 for activity that only benefited defendant by
$50.00.
264 See supra subpart ill.A.
265 See supra subpart ill.C. Defendants should take the possibility of attorneys' fees
into account when they decide whether to undertake ventures of uncertain legality. Whether
they often do so is problematic.
266 See supra subpart ill.D.
267 See supra subpart ill.B. Insurance could be another complication because
defendants can sometimes insure themselves against the financial losses from antitrust
actions. See Insurance Policy Cover.v Legal Expenses Incurred by University in Antitrust
Suit, 61 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1527, at 156 (Aug. 1, 1991).
268 See supra subpart ill.H.
2 69 These adjustments minimize the defendant's attempted gains and maximize the
defendant's payouts, thereby tending to produce a high ratio.
270 This result is almost exactly equivalent to treble damages. If defendant simply
overcharged by $1.00 and had to pay a total of$3.00, defendant would find itself with a net
loss of$2.00. The $2.00/$1.00 ratio is essentially equivalent to the 2.01 calculated using the
high range of adjustments. Lawyers can advise their clients that they might have to pay
treble damages after all.
271 These adjustments maximize the defendant's attempted gains and minimize the
defendant's payouts, thereby tending to produce a low ratio.
272 Even under this scenario crime does not pay. Under these assumptions a defendant
that tried to overcharge by a dollar would have to pay back that dollar and also another 51
cents.
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Table 5: Effects on Defendants
Effects of Low
Adjustments on
Defendants

Effects of High
Adjustments on
Defendants

7.64%for7yrs. =
1.67; to 10.22% for 8
yrs. = 2.18

1.00 X 1.68 = 1.68

1.00x2.18 =2.18

B. Attorneys' fees

.35% to .80% ofthe
transfer

1.68 - .80 = .88

2.18- .35 = 1.83

C. Other costs of

.20% to .65% ofthe
transfer

.88 - .65 = .23

1.83- .20 = 1.63

Range
of
Adjustments

I. Initial overcharge of$1.00
A. No prejudgment
interest

n. Litigation effects

pursuing case

m. Effects of tentative award of $3.00 plus "reasonable" attorneys' fees
D. Tentative award

$3.00 plus (.30 to .60)

3.60

3.30

E. After effects of the
statute of
limitations

unrecoverable 10% to
30% of$3.00

3.60- (10% of3.00)
= 3.30

3.30- (30% of3.00)
= 2.40

.23 - 3.60 = -3.37

1.63 - 2.40 = -.77

F. Net effects of
award

Ratio of Defendant's Total Expenditures to Attempted Gain:
Low Adjustments

Defendant is forced to pay 3.37/1.68 = 2.01 times its
attempted gain.

High Adjustments

Defendant is forced to pay .77/2.18 = .35 times its
attempted gain.

Mean Adjustment

Defendant is forced to pay (3.37
1.07 times its attempted gain.

+ .77)/(1.68 + 2.18) =
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CONCLUSIONS

Antitrust damage awards should be significantly greater than the actual
damages caused by these violations to account for detection problems, proof
problems, and risk aversion. It is difficult to determine what this multiplier
should be because, as Judge Easterbrook has observed, "there is no right
answer to the sanctions problem. "273
Judge Easterbrook might have added, "We do not know the actual level of
the current multiplier., Despite the apparent precision of some of the
calculations in this Article, all of its estimates should be regarded only as first
approximations. Additional research undoubtedly will refine these estimates by
finding more precise approximations for quantities this Article has attempted to
specify, and also for those that were omitted.274 Each of this Article's estimates
must be approached with extreme caution. For example, subpart IV(A) used a
deterrence model to calculate a mean estimate that awarded damages are only
sixty-eight percent of actual damages. This figure should not, however, lead
one confidently to conclude that the "true" mean is sixty-eight percent, as
opposed to forty-eight percent or eighty-eight percent. The data are far too
uncertain to permit such precision. But even the rough data presented in this
Article should lead one safely to conclude that awarded damages are much
more likely to be the equivalent of actual damages than treble damages. This
conclusion, moreover, is relatively robust.275

273 Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 448.
274 For example, this Article has not separately analyzed the damages associated with
different types of antitrust violations. Nor has it attempted to explore related issues such as
the effects of the criminal antitrust provisions, or of various standing and contribution
issues. Nor has it attempted to compare the net deterrence or compensation effects of
antitrust damages with those for violations of other laws. See also supra notes 13, 75, 76,
82-84, 108, 114, 128, 130 and text accompanying notes 122-26 for reasons why this
Article's analysis has generally been conservative and has overstated the apparent damages
multiplier.
275 Because this Article's analysis depends upon the cumulative effects of a large
number of adjustments, even if a reasonable reader disagrees somewhat with one or two of
the adjustments, this disagreement is unlikely to have a significant effect on the final
conclusion. Suppose, for example, that one believed that while most of this Article's
estimates were reasonable, the range for umbrella effects should be changed from an
assumption of effects on a 10% to 30% fringe, to effects on a fringe of zero to 10%, and
also that allocative inefficiency was probably 10% to 25% as large as the transfer, not 25%
to 50%. The final mean estimate would change from average awarded damages of75% of
actual damages, to a revised figure of 95%. The Article's basic conclusion, that antitrust
damages are currently not trebled, would still be true.
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One could ask the significance of this Article's conclusion that antitrust
damages are not currently trebled from plaint:if'rs or defendant's perspective.
Surely few potential or actual plaintiffs or defendants ever perform a significant
part of the analysis presented in this Article.276 Because perceptions can be
crucial if plaintiffs and defendants believe, contrary to the results of this
Article, that damages actually are trebled, they probably behave accordingly a
great deal of the time. Furthermore, the most important attribute of antitrust
damages could be their uncertainty rather than their actual level or even the
perception of their average level. The uncertainty could be more important to
many plaintiffs and defendants than a damage claim's expected value.277
The level and nature of the discussion of antitrust damages in recent
years278 implies, however, that many do care about the "actual" overall level
of damages. Important policy analysis is predicated in part upon the assumption
that antitrust damages currently are, on the whole, at the threefold level. This
Article's conclusion that this assumption is at best unproven and most likely is
significantly in error, has several important implications.
First, some treble damage reform proposals of recent years are misguided.
Because damages levels appear to be at most singlefold, Congress should not
pass legislation that would lower the damages awarded for rule of reason or
relatively public antitrust violations. Instead, a crucial question is whether

276 Each party might have a rough idea of the probable length of its antitrust case, so
each might adjust somewhat for the lack of prejudgment interest, and perhaps for the value
of lost corporate time and attorneys' fees as well. The other factors, however, are less likely
to be considered.
277 Suppose a firm is contemplating participation in an undertaking that could be
considered either an illegal horizontal arrangement or a desirable joint venture, and that
legality is a close question. Suppose the firm's CEO asks his or her lawyers to describe the
possible damages that could flow from the arrangement. The lawyer might say that, because
legality is highly uncertain and depends upon many factors at present unknown, damages
could be zero or enormous. The contribution rules, moreover, mean that if the arrangement
is judged to be illegal, the firm could be liable for all of the resulting damages, or few, or
anywhere in-between. Just as the CEO starts to become exasperated, the lawyer adds that all
antitrust damages are automatically trebled. What does this last piece of news add to the
CEO's analysis?
Potential plaintiffs would hear similar advice, along with war stories about
unpredictable and biased judges and juries. Are plaintiffs' decisions to spend enough money
to enable them to "roll the dice" affected significantly by their belief that damages are
trebled? If the damages in a specific instance had an expected value of $1,000,000 before
trebling, the fact that an irrational jury could award nothing or $10,000,000 might be more
important than the trebling factor.
278 See supra notes 3, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12 and the sources cited therein.
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"hardcore" violations are adequately deterred by criminal penalties. If not,
Congress should consider raising the damages levels for these offenses.
Moreover, even relatively public rule of reason violations often are difficult to
prove, so all antitrust violations should give rise to awards that really are in
excess of actual damages. Higher awards might be appropriate for all types of
antitrust cases. A relatively noncontroversial first step that almost certainly
would lead to the imposition of more nearly optimal damages would be for
Congress to pass a law awarding prejudgment interest for antitrust violations.
Second, Illinois Brick repealers make more sense. The specter of sixfold or
higher damages for civil antitrust violations seems remote. If federal or state
Illinois Brick repealers led to effective double damages for antitrust violations,
this would almost certainly more nearly be optimal than the current situation.
Moreover, Illinois Brick repealers are almost certainly the best way to
compensate consumers who are indirect purchasers of supracompetitively
priced items. Potentially overlapping state antitrust and tort laws are also more
likely to be in the public interest because their combined effects are likely only
to increase awarded damages to the twofold level, rather than the sixfold level.
Third, judges should realize that awarded antitrust damages probably .are at
most equivalent to the single damages level. Judges should fight any conscious
or unconscious tendency to award defendants close decisions out of a reluctance
to "over-punish" defendants or "over-reward" plaintiffs. Because awarded
damages are not as severe as some might believe, judges should also be more
generous when they decide standing issues or compute the amount of damages
to award.
Finally, even if antitrust damages levels should be raised so that they do
result in the effective treble damages necessary to insure optimal deterrence of
anticompetitive conduct, one could ask whether the existing situation is
significantly worse than that involving many other areas of law. While some of
the factors this Article has analyzed are relatively unique to antitrust,279_ others
are not, including the adjustments for lack of prejudgment interest, statute of
limitations problems, attorneys' fees, corporate costs for plaintiffs to pursue the
case, and costs to the judicial system.280 This Article's analysis shows that
antitrust violations probably give rise to single damages at most, but an analysis
of tort and contract cases might show that tort and contract suits produce even

279 Umbrella effects of monopoly power, for example, would not occur for most other
types of violations.
280 Violations of other laws could also give rise to adjustments not relevant to antitrust
that were not considered in this Article.
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less recovery on the average. Even if true, such a showing is no reason not to
correct the antitrust damages multiplier.
This Article does not assert that the antitrust damages situation is unique,
or even that it is more egregious than that involving other areas of the law. The
primary purpose of this Article has been to advance the discussion within the
antitrust community about the true relative levels of damages and recovery.
Scholars in other fields should undertake a similar inquiry.

